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HOW FEDERAL AGENCIES SUE ON VICTIMS’
BEHALF: PARENS PATRIAE, EQUITABLE
REMEDIES, AND PROCEDURES
Collin Berger*
INTRODUCTION
Imagine a national bank’s practices violated a federal banking regulation and thereby cost some people their savings. Criminal charges or civil
penalties may be appropriate but might not make defrauded victims whole.
If the victims see a lawsuit as not worth the effort or they struggle to attract
appropriate representation, then no private legal action would undo the
bank’s harm. Enter the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”).
If the illegal actions enriched the bank or “involved a reckless disregard for
the law,” the OCC could issue a cease-and-desist order requiring the bank to
pay restitution to victims.1 If the bank were to violate that order, the OCC
could seek enforcement through a federal court.2
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2022; Master of Business
Administration, Notre Dame Mendoza College of Business, 2022; Bachelor of Arts from
the Princeton School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, 2014. I
would like to thank Professor Jay Tidmarsh for his guidance and my colleagues on the
Notre Dame Law Review for the effort they pour into editing every issue. I would also like to
thank my family, especially my wife, for their love and support.
1 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6) (2018); Enforcement Action Types, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER
OF
THE
CURRENCY, https://www.occ.gov/topics/laws-and-regulations/enforcementactions/enforcement-action-types/index-enforcement-action-types.html (last visited Mar.
3, 2021). Such cease-and-desist orders have been related to large penalties imposed on
banks. See Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1996 (2012) (describing a $394 million OCC settlement with banks
over “mortgage foreclosure abuses”); Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes Enforcement Action Against Eight Servicers for Unsafe and Unsound
Foreclosure Practices (Apr. 13, 2011), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/
2011/nr-occ-2011-47.html (describing the OCC imposing cease-and-desist orders); Press
Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Settles Civil Money Penalties
Against Large National Bank Mortgage Servicers for $394 Million; Penalty Assessment
Coordinated with Servicers’ Actions and Payments Under Federal-State Settlement (Feb. 9,
2012), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2012/nr-occ-2012-20.html
(describing the penalty as a settlement of the cease-and-desist orders).
2 12 U.S.C. § 1818(d).
1649
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Now imagine that the OCC’s cease-and-desist order was only an injunction or a penalty owed to the government and did not include restitution.
This could occur if the OCC’s authorizing statute did not permit “restitution”
or if the OCC did not invest the resources to find proof of enrichment or
reckless disregard.3 If the OCC believed the bank was threatening to violate
its injunction or penalty order, then it could still seek enforcement through a
federal court. There, under most circuits’ current standards and potentially
beyond statutes’ authorization,4 the OCC might seek and the court could
grant restitution that was not in the original OCC order.
Now imagine resetting the scenario and adding another twist: the victims
sue the bank, and the OCC separately argues before a federal court that the
bank should pay restitution as part of its order’s enforcement. Although the
OCC’s role marshals public resources to advocate for victims’ interests, only
the private collective action has established court procedures to ensure different victims are adequately represented and restitution is distributed
appropriately.5 Courts would not force the wrongdoer to pay full restitution
in two lawsuits, so to the extent the OCC suit adjudicates, liquidates, and
distributes victim restitution, that suit cannot only expand on statutes’
explicit remedies but also sidestep the court’s victim-protecting procedures.
Much of these hypothetical OCC actions hinge on statutes, which vary
across agencies and their areas of enforcement. However, one cross-agency
step that courts have scrutinized recently is federal courts’ ability to allow and
grant an agency’s request for victim compensation when statutes do not
explicitly allow it. This ability to “strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten . . . net
profits” appears in cases and statutes as “restitution,” “accounting,” or “disgorgement” depending on the era, and it is based on equitable principles
that aim to assist victims without becoming punitive.6 Not all instances of
restitution or disgorgement are within courts’ equitable power, though. A
pair of Supreme Court cases recently differentiated between, on the one
hand, disgorgements that were penalties and therefore did not benefit from
courts’ equitable powers and, on the other hand, disgorgements that were
implicit in a statute that granted “equitable relief.”7 While the former type of
disgorgement is primarily punitive, in the public interest, and often does not
benefit victims,8 the latter is usually given to victims.9 In the Supreme
Court’s 2020 term, AMG Capital Management, LLC v. FTC examined a circuit
split over scenarios like the hypothetical OCC lawsuit in which an agency
3 Id. § 1818(b)(6).
4 See infra subsections I.B.1 (describing the basis for the court exercising its equitable
authority to grant such a remedy in the absence of a statutory prohibition) and I.B.2
(describing the current circuit split that has emerged over this).
5 Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 530–32, 535, 538–39
(2011) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Distributing Justice]; see infra Section II.A.
6 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942–44 (2020).
7 Id. at 1940 (citing Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635 (2017)).
8 Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643–44.
9 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1940.
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seeks disgorgement as an equitable extension of a statute’s language.10 As
this Note describes,11 the Supreme Court’s 2020 ruling in Liu v. SEC and
other decisions suggest the Court will rein in situations like the OCC hypothetical but uphold precedents that recognized courts’ broad equitable
remedies.
Even after AMG Capital Management clarifies what courts can do when
they hear agency cases, the frameworks around how and when agencies can
seek redress for victims will remain thin even as agencies disburse billions to
victims annually. The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) alone
ordered $3.6 billion of disgorgements in fiscal year 2020,12 and calendar year
2019 saw the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) disburse $136 million of consumer “redress” and record $1.2 billion of “new redress, disgorgement[,] and
civil contempt awards.”13 Even though the 2017 Kokesh v. SEC case found
that SEC disgorgements are penalties rather than equitable relief,14 the SEC
subsequently concentrated on “investigations which hold the most promise
for returning funds to investors.”15 The basis for classifying SEC disgorgements as penalties under Kokesh may therefore be weaker now or in the
future. Agencies as diverse as the United States Postal Service (USPS) and
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) all have processes for benefitting
victims of wrongdoing, and these processes’ procedures vary.16 Despite this
range, cases examining what agencies can do in federal courts focus on
equity in the federal courts, not on the standing of administrative agencies.
10 FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 427, 435 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
2020 WL 3865250 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (No. 19-508) (affirming precedent that gave a broad
reading to court remedies the FTC could seek); FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d
764, 779, 785 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 2020 WL 3865251 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (No. 19825), cert. vacated, 2020 WL 6551765 (U.S. Nov. 9, 2020) (No. 19-825) (creating a circuit
split by overturning Seventh Circuit precedent and reading FTC remedies narrowly). The
Ninth Circuit case the Supreme Court reviewed was consolidated with the conflicting Seventh Circuit case until the Supreme Court vacated its grant of certiorari to the Seventh
Circuit case. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 2020 WL 3865250; Credit Bureau Ctr., 2020 WL 3865251,
2020 WL 6551765. One explanation why the Court dismissed the Seventh Circuit case but
heard the Ninth Circuit case is the appointment of Justice Barrett who, in her former role
on the Seventh Circuit, voted on whether the circuit would hear the case en banc. Amy
Howe, Justices Grant New Cases Involving Challenges to Social Security Administration Judges,
SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 9, 2020), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/11/justices-grant-newcases-involving-challenges-to-social-security-administration-judges/. A majority of Seventh
Circuit judges voted against hearing the case en banc. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 767
n.1.
11 See infra Part I.
12 SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, 2020 ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2020). Average disgorgements in the
previous five fiscal years equaled $2.9 billion. Id.
13 Stats & Data 2019, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2019/statsand-data (last visited Oct. 3, 2020). It is not clear how much of the $1.2 billion is restitution and how much is penalties.
14 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017).
15 SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 21 (2019).
16 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 504, 507.
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By defining this aspect of agencies’ purview through federal courts’ limitations, courts have linked judicial power to agencies’ executive power and
given limited direction to agencies. Such direction could address procedural
shortcomings or improve statutes’ effectiveness at compensating victims.
In contrast to the relationship between agency lawsuits and courts’ powers, the equitable doctrine of parens patriae permits states, tribes, and territories to sue on behalf of citizens, but only when there is a sovereign or quasisovereign interest at stake.17 Applying at least some elements of this doctrine
to federal agencies would give a foundation for agencies’ victim-compensating actions that is independent from courts’ powers and emphasizes victims’
interests.
This Note adds to the literature about federal agency actions on victims’
behalf by incorporating recent cases and comparing cases about courts’
power to parens patriae cases. Part I describes these two lines of cases: the
parens patriae cases that define what states can do in federal court, and the
cases on courts’ equitable powers in agency suits through Kokesh, Liu, and
AMG Capital Management. Part II then considers potential practical issues
with current agency processes, including a simple empirical analysis of the
SEC’s records and how they might reflect the agency’s internal strategy and
deadlines. Part III considers how a federal parens patriae framework distinct
from states’ parens patriae standing could orient agency suits to victims’ benefit without contradicting existing law.
I. HOW

THE

GOVERNMENT CAN SUE

ON

CITIZENS’ BEHALF

Before proceeding, it is worth contextualizing agency lawsuits on citizens’ behalf. A wronged individual suing a private party for money is a quintessential form of litigation. Such suits reach a federal court if, among other
things, the plaintiff has standing, like if a federal statute identifies the defendant’s action toward the plaintiff as an injury and then specifies a remedy.18
If there are enough individual plaintiffs, a lawsuit against one defendant
enters the realm of class action suits. Because of the added coordination
challenges among individual participants and in awards’ distribution, some
literature has compared class action settlement funds to miniature private
administrative agencies.19 If the alleged wrongdoing harms the collective
public interest as defined in statutes and regulations, prosecutors and regulators press criminal charges or impose monetary penalties that wrongdoers
often pay into the public coffers. For example, many of the SEC’s disgorge17 Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REV. 486, 493–94 (2012).
18 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (identifying an injury in
fact, a causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury, and
judicial redressability as essential elements of standing).
19 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 512 (quoting Richard A. Nagareda,
Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 921 (1996)).
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ments fall here under Kokesh because of their emphasis on punishment and
deterrence even though statutes do not define them as penalties.20
There are other situations, though, in which a plaintiff brings a suit to
rectify a wrong without suffering a particularized injury, yet the plaintiff still
has standing and can access federal courts. One such variant is qui tam cases,
through which private plaintiffs help enforce the public’s laws (i.e., a private
plaintiff seeks redress for the public’s injury). In a sense, a statute that establishes private rights of action creates an enforcement mechanism, but the
resulting cases hinge on the harm the plaintiff suffered and not the public’s
harm. Another variant that has evolved in recent decades is roughly the
opposite of a qui tam case of private enforcement of public interests: the
public in the form of a government entity uses the courts to extract compensation for the alleged wrongdoer’s victims.
Three distinct types of these public actions are worth noting with respect
to federal courts. One has been described as “criminal class actions” where
federal prosecutors settle criminal charges with corporate defendants in
exchange for the defendants’ creation of “victim restitution funds” that operate like private class action suits’ funds.21 While such cases’ patterns can
inform analysis of other federal actors’ suits, these settlements are outside
this Note’s focus on civil case proceedings. A second version involves state
attorneys general who “long have understood their role to include a compensatory function” and seek victim compensation through state and federal
courts.22 These cases operate under statutes’ authorization or parens
patriae.23 Third, federal actors like administrative agencies may bring a civil
suit against a party to undo results from infractions of federal law and to
benefit victims. For example, SEC disgorgements like the one from Liu
might be in this category as they benefit victims and might not be so large as
to be penalties. This area defined by statutes and equitable principles is this
Note’s focus. Figure 1 maps this contextualization with this Note’s focus in
the lower right.

20 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017).
21 Adam S. Zimmerman & David M. Jaros, The Criminal Class Action, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
1385, 1390 (2011).
22 Lemos, supra note 17, at 488 & n.5. State regulators are absent from this list; as
their claims derive from state regulations, they would look to state courts, and cases of
theirs that occur in federal courts would apply state law.
23 See id. at 493, 495.
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Is the plaintiff in federal court
one or more private victim(s) or
a representative of a class of
private victims?

Yes

No

How many
victims?

One/Few

Is this a private
plaintiff suing for the
public’s injury?

Yes

No

Potential
qui tam
case.

Is this a state/federal
government collecting
funds owed to victims?

Many

Straightforward
case for standing
purposes. Possible
exercise of a
statute’s private
right of action.

Potential class
action
litigation.
Additional
court scrutiny
per rules.

No

Criminal prosecution,
suits for injunctions,
lawsuits by
municipalities, etc.

Prosecutor

Yes

Is the plaintiff a federal
prosecutor, a state or state
official, or another federal
actor (e.g., an agency)?

Other federal

State

Possibly a settlement
fund for criminal
charges (“criminal
class action”).

A.

Lawsuit under a statute
or as parens patriae.

Lawsuit under a statute
or the court’s equitable
powers within statutes’
limits. Note’s focus.

Parens Patriae for State Actors

As described below, federal courts have an ongoing debate concerning
the extent of their authority to grant equitable remedies to federal agencies.24 Because the statutes in those cases gave agencies a foot in the courthouse door, those cases did not examine whether agencies can access federal
courts but instead assessed what agencies can do once in court. To reach
that second question, states, territories, and tribes must overcome the hurdle
24

See infra Section I.B.
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of standing. Courts have developed the nebulous doctrine of parens patriae
to assess whether these nonfederal sovereigns clear that hurdle.25 Although
the doctrine has only gained traction with nonfederal actors, parens patriae
offers a perspective on federal government suits that is distinct from the
debate on courts’ equitable remedies. Since a court must resolve standing
questions before reaching the equitable remedies question, this Note examines the first matter first.
1.

Precedent and Approaches to Parens Patriae

Courts began to recognize states’ parens patriae standing in the early
twentieth century as a gap emerged between situations that allowed states to
sue on citizens’ behalf and situations in which states lacked standing. The
former group included when a state validly asserted its particular interest as a
sovereign under the Constitution, such as the state’s interest in other sovereigns recognizing the state’s sovereignty within its boundaries.26 The latter
group included when a state had no sovereign interest, like when it was
“merely sponsoring the claims of a small number of individual citizens”27
rather than suing as the “real party in interest.”28 As the Supreme Court
crystallized its position on these types of state interests, it had to assess states’
attempts to assert interests that were not squarely sovereign or specific to a
limited set of private parties.
Over the twentieth century and beyond, the Court invoked the increasingly broad doctrine of parens patriae (literally “parent of the country”) as it
granted standing to states asserting injuries to these “quasi-sovereign” interests.29 A quasi-sovereign interest was “a judicial construct that d[id] not lend
25 See, e.g., Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592,
600–01 (1982).
26 See id. at 601; RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID
L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 280 (7th
ed. 2015) (noting how “the prevailing view” on interstate sovereignty disputes was that
these disputes were “not justiciable at common law, [but] were made justiciable by the
Constitution”). There were also situations in which a state had standing but for a nonsovereign interest, such as when it sued as the proprietor of land or a particular business
endeavor (e.g., specific tax revenues). See FALLON ET AL., supra, at 279–80; Alfred L. Snapp
& Son, 458 U.S. at 601–02. In those non-sovereign cases, the state was suing for itself and
not for its citizens.
27 FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 279.
28 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601–02; FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 279.
29 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 600–01 (tracing the term’s early common-law
origins that were separate from its current use in American standing law); see FALLON ET
AL., supra note 26, at 281–83 (tracing courts’ widening jurisdiction). But see Lemos, supra
note 17, at 493–94 (connecting parens patriae with both sovereign and quasi-sovereign
interests but speaking to parens patriae in both the state court and federal court contexts).
Although the terminology and caselaw’s evolution lend themselves to seeing sovereign
interests, quasi-sovereign interests, and non-sovereign interests as a spectrum, the Supreme
Court has described each of them plus states’ interests as a proprietor as four sets of interests that “stand apart” from one another. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 602.
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itself to a simple or exact definition,”30 but some broad characteristics
emerged across cases. The interest had to be concrete enough to satisfy Article III’s actual controversy requirement, distinct enough from private interests that the state was a real party, and (generally) relevant to a “sufficiently
substantial segment of [the state’s] population.”31 For example, one state
had a quasi-sovereign interest when inflated railroad rates harmed its population’s “general progress and welfare.”32 In another case in which only a tiny
fraction of a territory’s population had claims against several companies, the
territory had a quasi-sovereign interest because the claims reflected the
entire population’s ability to participate in a federal program and the threat
of widespread discrimination against the population.33 The fact the plaintiff
was not a state did not affect the case’s parens patriae analysis.34 This case,
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel., Barez, is the Supreme Court’s
most extensive recent look at the parens patriae doctrine.35 As part of its
knowingly imprecise description of quasi-sovereign interests, that opinion
suggested that a state generally had a quasi-sovereign interest when it would
have tried to address the claimed injury through lawmaking if it could
have.36 Since states have successfully claimed far-reaching interests in cases
involving a limited number of its citizens, it remains unclear how narrow a
case must be before a state lacks parens patriae standing.37
30 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601.
31 Id. at 601, 602, 607–08; see FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 280–81; Lemos, supra
note 17, at 495.
32 FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 281–82 (quoting Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S.
439, 444 (1945)).
33 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 609–10.
34 See id. at 608–10, 608 n.15 (Puerto Rico “ha[d] a claim to represent its quasi-sovereign interests in federal court at least as strong as that of any State”). Courts have applied
Alfred L. Snapp & Son to American Indian tribal governments’ parens patriae claims. See,
e.g., United States v. Santee Sioux Tribe of Neb., 254 F.3d 728, 734 (8th Cir. 2001) (concluding the case involved too small a portion of the tribe’s citizens to support a parens
patriae claim); Navajo Nation v. Wells Fargo & Co., 344 F. Supp. 3d 1292, 1310–12 (D.N.M.
2018) (assessing the tribe’s parens patriae claim and concluding it failed to assert a quasisovereign interest distinct from its citizens’ interest).
35 See Lemos, supra note 17, at 494.
36 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607.
37 See FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 282 (raising the question of whether “any serious limit [exists] on parens patriae standing” after Alfred L. Snapp & Son); Lemos, supra
note 17, at 495 (citing Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 607). Alfred L. Snapp & Son was
unlike a number the earlier key Supreme Court cases on the parens patriae doctrine as it
began in a district court rather than under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction. As a
result of the limited precedent differentiating the two types of cases, it was possible “special
considerations” would limit the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction over states’ suits but
not limit district courts’ jurisdiction. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 603 n.12; see also id.
at 610–12 (Brennan, J., concurring). Because the Court avoided exploring the distinction
between district court parens patriae jurisdiction and Supreme Court original parens
patriae jurisdiction, this identified a lever future Courts could pull to adjust parens
patriae’s limits instead of describing those limits.
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The haziness of quasi-sovereign interests has paralleled the indistinct
contours of federal courts’ doctrine for using those interests.38 A recurring
explanation for the parens patriae doctrine has been that a state joining the
Union “surrender[ed] certain sovereign prerogatives” that could defend its
citizens’ interests, like the ability to employ diplomacy or force.39 From that
perspective, parens patriae gave states a tool for protecting its citizens’ interests after that surrender by recognizing that quasi-sovereign interests could
imbue a case with adequate “concrete adverseness” to satisfy standing.40 As
the doctrine included states’ protection of private interests, “the state’s interest may be parasitic on the interests of individual citizens” rather than something the state alone could assert because the aggregate effect of those
individual interests is an interest specific to the state.41 Going even further,
one reading of parens patriae precedent is that determining if a state has
standing through a quasi-sovereign interest is more a question of where a
state can sue (i.e., in federal versus state court) rather than a question of
whether the state can sue.42
This majority approach to parens patriae is not without controversy,
however. Rather than seeing parens patriae as opening courts to states that
had quasi-sovereign interests, Massachusetts v. EPA’s four-justice dissent
argued parens patriae added a hurdle states must clear to achieve standing.43
From this view, parens patriae gave a state standing but needed the state to
show both that its citizens satisfied standing’s usual requirements and that it
had a distinct quasi-sovereign interest.44 Absent the other elements of standing, a state having a quasi-sovereign interest was not enough to ensure the
case was adequately concrete for a federal court to hear it.45 This is consistent with a minority of courts that have limited states’ parens patriae authority to interests that could not be pursued through private litigation (e.g.,
discrimination against an entire state but not particular instances of discrimination).46 Although this view of parens patriae is not courts’ predominant
thinking, it may gain greater traction if the Supreme Court’s large minority
38 It is worth noting that some federal statutes authorize state actors to sue on their
citizens behalf and refer to those state actors as parens patriae. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 15c
(2018). As those statutes use the phrase “parens patriae” as descriptors around explicit
statutory authorization, those are irrelevant to this Section’s description of courts’ parens
patriae doctrine.
39 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007) (describing how “States are not
normal litigants for the purposes of invoking federal jurisdiction”); see Alfred L. Snapp &
Son, 458 U.S. at 603–04 (quoting Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901)).
40 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 517, 519 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962)); see Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 604.
41 See Lemos, supra note 17, at 494–95 (describing this as the majority approach that
“[p]roperly understood” Alfred L. Snapp & Son).
42 See id. at 495 n.38.
43 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
44 See id.
45 See id.
46 See Lemos, supra note 17, at 494.
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becomes a majority or if Congress legislates guidance on courts’ parens
patriae jurisdiction.47 Of course, the doctrine can evolve in the other direction if the Court continues parens patriae’s expansion or Congress removes
court-imposed limits.48
2.

The Federal Government and Current Parens Patriae Law: A Poor Fit

One area where parens patriae has not been widely invoked or applied is
suits by federal actors on citizens’ behalf. Exceptions exist. Almost a decade
before the Supreme Court enlarged and loosely codified the parens patriae
doctrine in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, the Ninth Circuit’s assessment of a state
plaintiff’s standing asserted, “the federal government and the states, as the
twin sovereigns in our constitutional scheme, may in appropriate circumstances sue as parens patriae to vindicate interests of their citizens.”49
Although the Ninth Circuit cited a number of Supreme Court precedents in
support of this,50 those precedents had state rather than federal plaintiffs
and did not accord the federal government the same authority they granted
states.51 A later Ninth Circuit case quoted the earlier Ninth Circuit case’s
assertion about the federal government but only to show parens patriae did
not extend to municipalities.52 Court of appeals cases that cited either of
these two cases did not apply parens patriae standing to federal government
plaintiffs.
The Ninth Circuit was not the only circuit to suggest the federal government could assert a claim as parens patriae. Two years after Alfred L. Snapp
& Son, the Second Circuit joined the expansion of the “[o]nce quite limited”
doctrine by describing “the state or the United States [as] present[ing] itself
‘in the attitude of parens patriae, trustee, guardian or representative of all her
citizens.’”53 The United States and a state were both plaintiffs in the case,
and the court recognized their distinct claims as parens patriae.54 The
47 See id. at 497 (citing cases that describe parens patriae as a prudential standing
doctrine rather than a constitutional one).
48 See id.; FALLON ET AL., supra note 26, at 281–82.
49 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.
1973). The case concerned a state plaintiff, so the observations about state plaintiffs supported the court’s conclusion. However, the added point about the federal government
did not support the conclusion except to the extent that it may have illustrated the parens
patriae principle the court applied to the state’s claim.
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 257–60, 265 (1972) (discussing a state’s ability to act as parens patriae at length but dismissing the United States’
ability to “recover for economic injuries to its sovereign interests” under the statutory
framework); Georgia v. Pa. R.R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 445–52 (1945) (examining the state’s
ability as parens patriae); North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 375–76 (1923) (mentioning only states in the context of parens patriae).
52 United States v. City of Pittsburg, 661 F.2d 783, 786–87 (9th Cir. 1981).
53 United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984 (2d Cir. 1984)
(emphasis in original) (quoting Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1, 19 (1900)).
54 Id. at 986.
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Supreme Court case the Second Circuit quoted to support this was a dispute
between two states, so the Supreme Court had only considered a state’s claim
on citizens’ behalf.55 Court of appeals decisions that cited the Second Circuit’s decision did not apply its conclusion about the federal government,
and only a few published district court opinions have built on the Second
Circuit’s position.56
Whether the federal government can claim parens patriae standing to
sue on citizens’ behalf may depend on the federal injury and whether the
court follows the majority view of parens patriae. If a statute authorizes a
particular federal government claim, then parens patriae is irrelevant since
the statute allows the federal government into court.57 A question about
parens patriae’s applicability would be more appropriate if a large number of
citizens have similar federal claims and the federal government wishes to sue
on behalf of those claims.58
Under the majority view that the parens patriae doctrine helps states
have their day in court, recognition of federal government parens patriae
standing would not fit well. If the doctrine exists as a substitute for the sovereign powers states surrendered to join the United States, then the United
States government, which received its sovereign prerogatives from the people
and states,59 never experienced a similar surrender or exchange. A federal
government parens patriae power would thus just expand the set of recognized federal powers, raising federalism concerns as the federal government
would take citizen advocacy positions like Puerto Rico’s antidiscrimination
interest in Alfred L. Snapp & Son and Massachusetts’s climate change position
55 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. at 19.
56 See, e.g., United States v. Bliss, 132 F.R.D. 58, 60–61 (E.D. Mo. 1990) (recognizing
the United States’ interest); FTC v. First Cap. Consumer Membership Servs., Inc., 206
F.R.D. 358, 364 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (framing the FTC as “a guardian or representative of all of
its citizens”); United States v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 326 F.R.D. 411, 417 (S.D.N.Y. 2018)
(finding the federal government acting as parens patriae would adequately represent proposed intervenors).
57 The scope of what remedies such statutes give federal agencies is the focus of Section I.B.
58 One hypothetical based on Alfred L. Snapp & Son would be if a large company
abused a federal employment program to discriminate against citizens born in a variety of
western states just because they were born in those states. Based on Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
the federal government could try to claim a quasi-sovereign interest in the aggregated discriminatory injuries. Another hypothetical is that a defendant is unjustly enriched by violating federal law but the relevant statute only mentions lawsuits by wronged parties, not by
the government. If the defendant harmed enough people, the federal government might
sue on behalf of all those private injuries by claiming to act as parens patriae on the basis of
the quasi-sovereign interest of all citizens’ general economic well-being. See Alfred L.
Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel., Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (describing states’
“quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of its
residents in general”). The latter hypothetical is akin to the FTC lawsuits described in
subsection I.B.2 if the statute did not allow FTC injunctions.
59 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 519 (2007).
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in Massachusetts v. EPA.60 Modern federal interests are broad, and the lower
limit for states’ quasi-sovereign interests is small and hazy, so a federal executive that can have parens patriae standing would also raise separation of powers questions over this substantial executive authority. The history and usage
of parens patriae standing under the majority view therefore raise potentially
fatal concerns for applying the entire doctrine to the federal government.
In contrast, the minority view of parens patriae is more compatible with
including the federal government. If parens patriae exists to ensure sovereign-brought cases are adequately concrete for adjudication, then it would be
counterintuitive for this added hurdle to apply to sovereigns that have general lawmaking abilities, but not to a sovereign that has constitutionally limited powers. Whereas the majority’s reasoning conjures the image of an
exchange where parens patriae standing is the payoff, the minority view
implies parens patriae standing is the trade-off: the sovereign can have standing but only if it has a quasi-sovereign interest that is distinct from the claims
of citizens who would have standing. Parens patriae could then operate as a
framework for federal courts to check if they should hear federal executive
officials’ legal claims. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the
Ninth Circuit case that referred to both federal and state governments as
parens patriae found the government plaintiff did not claim an appropriate
injury.61 Additionally, the core question in the Second Circuit case that recognized federal government parens patriae was whether the government
plaintiffs adequately represented their citizens.62 This is closer to the minority’s emphasis on a sovereign having concrete standing than the majority’s
emphasis on respecting sovereigns’ authority.63 As a result, a future refocusing of the parens patriae doctrine toward the minority’s more inquisitive
approach could open parens patriae standing to the federal government.
In summary, courts generally have not granted the federal government
or its agencies parens patriae standing, so under current law, a federal actor
seeking to sue in federal court on citizens’ behalf should look for a statute
authorizing such a lawsuit. If the statute permits the federal actor’s desired
remedy, the federal actor has a clear path. If the statute does not specifically
state that remedy, then the actor is in the territory covered by the next Sec60 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 608; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
61 In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 131 (9th Cir.
1973).
62 United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984–88 (2d Cir.
1984) (finding sovereigns suing as parens patriae presumably provided all of their citizens
adequate representation).
63 This is not to say the Second Circuit case fits squarely within the minority approach
to parens patriae. The case presumes a sovereign acting as parens patriae adequately represents its citizens, which conflicts with parens patriae standing being a check for standing
plus a quasi-sovereign interest. Even so, the case casually erased the distinction between
federal and state sovereigns when the question concerned whether the sovereign’s case
would be thorough and adverse enough for the court to hear it. See id. Cases like Alfred L.
Snapp & Son that centered on whether a sovereign had the authority to bring a case did
not erase that distinction. See 458 U.S. 592, 594, 607 (1982).
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tion of this Note. Even though federal actors are unlikely to receive parens
patriae standing, the doctrine adds some nuance to their citizen-benefitting
cases. The federal government may have a distinct quasi-sovereign interest in
resolving an injury to a substantial segment of the American population or an
injury that affects an interest (e.g., a lack of discrimination) shared by the
entire citizenry. For example, if someone defrauded investors, the SEC or
another federal actor would arguably have a quasi-sovereign interest in the
victims’ receiving restitution because that restitution would improve national
capital markets’ efficiency and the enforcement of laws protecting that efficiency. Again, most courts would not recognize standing for this quasi-sovereign interest, but the interest would exist. Based on the emphases in the
current majority and minority views, the most likely way a federal actor would
receive parens patriae standing is if the minority’s more cautious recognition
of parens patriae standing gains traction. For now, though, the federal government will probably sit on these quasi-sovereign interests.
B.
1.

Equitable Jurisdiction for Federal Agencies

Through the 2019–2020 Term

When a federal statute allows a federal regulator to bring a suit in federal court, the core question over decades of cases has been the extent of the
federal courts’ power under statutes and equity, not the authority of the
agency bringing the suit. Federal victim compensation funds have a long
history extending from the early 1800s, when Congress compensated victims
of natural disasters, through the twenty-first century.64 However, federal
processes of extracting funds from wrongdoers for victims’ benefit only
received Supreme Court scrutiny after World War II.
a.

Complete Relief Through Courts’ Equitable Powers: Porter and
Mitchell

Less than a decade after it recognized agencies’ ability to pursue financial sanctions through civil litigation,65 the Supreme Court in Porter v. Warner
Holding Co.66 set an example that it still cites favorably.67 During this period
of broad deference to agencies,68 the Court found that an agency official
64 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 518–19. Examples of recent compensation funds include the September 11 Victim Compensation Fund and a fund for
victims of a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
65 See Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400, 402 (1938).
66 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
67 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1943 (2020).
68 See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 521 & n.89. Justice Murphy,
who wrote the Court’s opinion in Porter, wrote the majority opinion in SEC v. Chenery Corp.
(Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947). That case was deferential to agencies as “the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation [i.e., how agencies implemented policy under the APA] is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative agency [rather than a court].” Id. at 203. Justice Frankfurter
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“invoked the jurisdiction of the District Court to enjoin” statutorily prohibited actions, so “all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are
available for the proper and complete exercise of that jurisdiction,” barring a
prohibition that is a “necessary and inescapable inference” from a statute.69
The vague language of the statute that the case reviewed permitted the “exercise of the District Court’s equitable discretion,”70 where the powers within
that discretion “assume[d] an even broader and more flexible character”
when “the public interest is involved . . . than when only a private controversy
is at stake.”71 While the statute at issue did not explicitly permit victim restitution, the court could grant it for either of two reasons: restitution was an
“equitable adjunct” to what the statute explicitly permitted, or restitution was
“appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance with the Act.”72 A court
granting restitution therefore “g[a]ve effect to [the statute’s] purposes”
including “[f]uture compliance” in addition to “restoring the status quo and
ordering the return of that which rightfully belongs to the” victim.73 Subsequent suits could pursue the dual goals of enforcement and compensation,
and this ruling is the basis of more recent tension between administrative
suits and private class action suits for the same wrongdoing.74
The Court applied and built on Porter in 1960 in a case brought by the
Labor Department on behalf of specific employees. Under the statute at
issue in Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,75 district courts had jurisdiction
to “restrain violations of [the statute] . . . [p]rovided, [t]hat no court shall
have jurisdiction . . . to order the payment to employees of unpaid minimum
wages . . . as liquidated damages.”76 Looking to Porter, the Court concluded
that Congress’s entrustment of a statute’s enforcement to a federal court
included a “cognizan[ce] of the historic power of equity to provide complete
dissented in both Porter and Chenery II. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 408; Chenery II, 332 U.S. at
218. The only other Chenery II dissenter (ignoring justices who did not participate) was
Justice Jackson, who did not participate in Porter. See Porter, 328 U.S. at 403; Chenery II, 332
U.S. at 209.
69 Porter, 328 U.S. at 397–98. For a more thorough examination of this case, see Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 522–25.
70 Porter, 328 U.S. at 399 (The statute “expressly authorizes the District Court . . . to
grant ‘a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other order’ . . .
[where] ‘other order’ contemplates a remedy . . . entered in the exercise of the District
Court’s equitable discretion.”). But see Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 522
(“Because the EPCA gave the agency power to obtain injunctive relief against landlords
[(i.e., because of the injunction and not the statute’s ‘other order’ wording)] . . . , the
Court held that the OPA was entitled to seek other equitable remedies available in federal
court . . . .”).
71 Porter, 328 U.S. at 398.
72 Id. at 399–400.
73 Id. at 400, 402.
74 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 522, 524.
75 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
76 Id. at 289 (quoting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 17, 52 Stat.
1060, 1069, amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 15, 63
Stat. 910, 919–20) (emphasis removed)).
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relief in the light of the statutory purposes.”77 This was consistent with the
contemporaneous judicial approach that identified broad judicial power to
advance statutes’ goals.78 The statute’s “central aim” in Mitchell was to rely on
victims to raise their claims, and the case’s agency plaintiff had acted on
those claims, so courts could allow restitution so employees would not have a
monetary incentive to stay quiet about violations.79
At the same time it read Congress’s grant of power to courts broadly, the
Court narrowly read an amendment to the statute that limited judicial powers in suits brought by an agency on victims’ behalf.80 The amendments that
prohibited courts from ordering “the payment . . . of unpaid minimum
wages” also gave an agency power to “recover unpaid wages . . . in the clearest
cases” where courts had settled issues of law.81 The Court found “no indication in the language of [the amendments], or in the legislative history, that
Congress intended [the limitation] to have a wider effect,” and the “amendments evidence a purpose to make only limited modifications in the nature
and extent of the Secretary’s power to obtain reimbursement of unpaid compensation.”82 Porter’s broad equitable powers and emphasis on a statute’s
purposes therefore led the Mitchell Court to see extensive implicit powers and
narrow limitations within statutes about agency suits on victims’ behalf. If an
equitable remedy supported the statute’s purpose and was not clearly
blocked by the statute, courts had extensive freedom to grant remedies.83

77 Id. at 291–92.
78 For example, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak a few years after Mitchell cited both Porter and
Mitchell and concluded, “it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose.” 377 U.S. 426, 433–34 (1964).
Borak’s approach to identifying implied private causes of action in a statute has been
replaced with a “more cautious course” that focuses on statutory intent and blocks judgecreated causes of action that conflict with that intent. Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1855 (2017) (citing Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 42, 45–46 (1977); Cort v. Ash,
422 U.S. 66, 68–69 (1975)); see Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001).
79 Mitchell, 361 U.S. at 292–93, 296.
80 See id. at 294.
81 Id. at 289, 294 (quoting the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 17, 52 Stat.
1060, 1069, amended by the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 15, 63
Stat. 910, 919–20) (citing the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1949, ch. 736, § 14, 63
Stat. 910, 919)).
82 Id. at 294–95.
83 See Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under the Federal Trade Commission Act:
Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1139, 1190 (1992) (quoting
Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1960); Porter v. Warner
Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 400 (1946)) (Porter and Mitchell together require, “[f]irst, the
payment of restitution must further the ‘policy of the act’ . . . [and s]econd, the statutory
scheme must not contain ‘by a necessary or inescapable inference’ a restriction on the
exercise of such authority.”).
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Pushing and Pulling: Supreme Court Cases Between Mitchell and
Kokesh

Since Mitchell, Supreme Court cases have supported public entities’
broad ability to seek monetary redress. In California v. American Stores Co.,84
Justice Stevens indirectly quoted Porter in reasoning that Congress intended a
statute’s “provision should be construed generously and flexibly pursuant to
principles of equity.”85 The Court did not distinguish American Stores from
cases like Porter even though American Stores’s plaintiff was a state rather than
a part of the federal government. The opinion continued to say, “[i]n a Government case the proof of the violation of law may itself establish sufficient
public injury to warrant relief[, but] . . . [a] private litigant, however, must
have standing . . . [and prove harm] to his own interests in order to obtain
relief.”86 Like Porter, this case noted that equity extends farther to grant
relief for the public interest than it does for private interests.87 Years later,
Justice Breyer in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran88 leveraged American
Stores and other cases to differentiate a case between private litigants from
precedents where the federal government was the plaintiff.89 Whereas
“[p]rivate plaintiffs . . . are far less likely to be able to secure broad relief,”
“[a] Government plaintiff has legal authority broad enough to allow it to”
pursue “redress” and “the relief necessary to protect the public from” conduct contrary to a statute.90
At the same time, a couple cases have identified or implied limitations
on equitable reliefs courts can grant for the benefit of victims. In the class
action suit of Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,91 Justice Scalia articulated a narrower view of equitable relief than Porter and Mitchell implied.92 As the Court
quoted favorably long after Mertens, Justice Scalia observed that historically
there were “many situations . . . [where] an equity court could establish
purely legal rights and grant legal remedies which would otherwise be
beyond the scope of its authority.”93 Justice Scalia continued by finding that
equitable relief can include “categories of relief that were typically available in
equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory
damages)” that were a subset of what a court of equity could grant.94 Conse84 495 U.S. 271 (1990).
85 Id. at 294–95; see Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (quoting
Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
86 Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. at 295–96.
87 See id. at 295 (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552
(1937)).
88 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
89 Id. at 170–71.
90 Id.
91 508 U.S. 248 (1993).
92 See id. at 256–58.
93 Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 577 U.S.
136, 147 (2016) (alteration in original) (quoting Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256).
94 Mertens, 508 U.S. at 256.
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quently, the statute at issue that granted equitable relief was clear enough as
to prohibit inferring a damages remedy.95 In contrast to Mitchell’s concern
for a statute’s central aim, Mertens rejected the class action litigants’ appeal to
the legislation’s purpose: “vague notions of a statute’s ‘basic purpose’ are
nonetheless inadequate to overcome the words of its text regarding the specific issue under consideration,” especially for a statute as “complex and
detailed” as the one at issue.96
In a similar vein, Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc.97 applied a “plain reading
of [a statute’s] remedial scheme” to find a private plaintiff could not pursue a
certain form of compensation related to environmental clean-up.98 Congress could have provided that remedy but did not, and the Court read a
limited purpose in the statute such that the requested relief was incompatible.99 Alexander v. Sandoval further marked how the Court’s approach to
identifying remedies from statutes had changed over time.100 Without statutory intent to create a private remedy, “a [private] cause of action does not
exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might be
as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”101 The Court had
“abandoned” the Mitchell-like approach of previous decades under which it
would provide “remedies as are necessary to . . . the congressional
purpose.”102
c.

Equitable Remedies’ Limits from History: Kokesh and Liu

Amid this growing textualism and general tightening of courts’ relief,
two recent Supreme Court cases about SEC disgorgements separated agency
disgorgements into equitable disgorgements and statute-authorized penalties. In the more recent of them, Liu v. SEC,103 Justice Sotomayor’s eightjustice majority opinion considered whether a disgorgement was allowed
under the district court’s equitable jurisdiction using the lens of Mertens’s
“categories of relief that were typically available in equity.”104 Since “equity
never ‘lends its aid to enforce a forfeiture or penalty’” that forces a wrongdoer to “pay[ ] more than a fair compensation to the person wronged,”105
equity courts historically restricted the stripping of “wrongdoers[’] . . . ill95 See id. at 260.
96 Id. at 261–62.
97 516 U.S. 479 (1996).
98 Id. at 484.
99 See id. at 485–86.
100 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
101 Id. at 286–87.
102 Id. at 287 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964)); see also Ziglar v.
Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017) (first quoting Alexander, 532 U.S. at 287; and then
quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)).
103 140 S. Ct. 1936 (2020).
104 Id. at 1942 (quoting Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993)).
105 Id. at 1941, 1943 (first quoting Marshall v. Vicksburg, 15 Wall. 146, 149 (1873); and
then quoting Tilghman v. Proctor, 125 U.S. 136, 146 (1888)).
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gotten gains” to “an individual wrongdoer’s net profits” to avoid the remedy
becoming punitive.106 Courts have used a variety of names for these equitable remedies, such as accounting, restitution, and disgorgement.107 Even so,
the Court identified a pattern across such rulings as cases limited these remedies to “net profits from wrongdoing after deducting legitimate expenses”
unless an undertaking’s “entire profit” is from “wrongful activity.”108
Curiously, the Court quoted Porter in support of this limitation on equitable disgorgements. Porter’s recognition of a district court’s equitable jurisdiction allowed “disgorge[ments of] profits, rents or property acquired in
violation of the” statute in the case.109 Liu quoted Porter’s use of “profits”
and skipped over rents and property.110 Because Porter’s scope included
landlords, rents, and property amounted to the revenues and assets acquired
through violations, each of which is likely greater than Liu’s net profits. This
may reflect the Court’s difficulty stitching precedents into a cohesive narrative, but it also implicitly reins in Porter’s broad equitable powers. Liu did not
mention Mitchell, so there is no attempt to reconcile a profit-based cap on
restitution with Mitchell’s blessing of far-reaching “complete [equitable] relief
in light of the statutory purposes.”111 That being said, Liu quoted Porter to
highlight district courts’ ability to marshal whatever equitable powers statutes
do not prohibit,112 so Porter and Mitchell cleared courts’ restraints within
equitable relief’s scope as Liu identified that scope’s outer bounds.
The amount of a disgorgement is not the only way it could move beyond
Liu’s parameters of equitable relief. In Kokesh v. SEC, the Court focused
exclusively on the question of whether certain SEC disgorgements were penalties without considering equity’s scope, which Liu later resolved as excluding penalties.113 According to Justice Sotomayor’s Kokesh opinion, penalties
punish for offenses against the state or public rather than for offenses against
individuals, and they have punishment and deterrence as their purpose
rather than compensation.114 Reflecting the muddled terminology for equitable disgorgements that Liu cataloged, Kokesh’s disgorgements were penalties because they were for harms to the United States, prioritized punishment
and deterrence, and treated compensation as a secondary goal.115
106 Id. at 1942.
107 See id. at 1942–44.
108 Id. at 1944–46 (quoting Root v. Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. Co., 105 U.S. 189, 203
(1881)).
109 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398–99 (1946).
110 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1943 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398–99).
111 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291–92 (1960).
112 See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1946–47 (quoting Porter, 328 U.S. at 398).
113 See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1642 & n.3 (2017); Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941, 1946.
114 See Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1642 (quoting Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 667–68
(1892)).
115 See id. at 1643–44; Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941, 1942–44 (summarizing Kokesh and discussing the historical usage of different terms). As part of its analysis, Kokesh cited Porter for
distinguishing between statute-derived penalties owed to the government and equitable
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Liu added to Kokesh’s emphasis on a disgorgement’s characteristics over
the relevant statute’s terminology for the disgorgement. Under existing statutes, SEC disgorgements after Kokesh could conform to equity’s limits.116 In
dicta, Liu also offered guidance to district courts about equitable remedies:
they “generally require[ ]” the agency to “return” wrongful gains to
“wronged” parties,117 they require individual rather than joint-and-several liability except for “partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing,”118 and they
require deduction of legitimate expenses.119 Historical disgorgements that
violated any one of these principles were in “considerable tension with equity
practices,”120 suggesting the measure of whether a disgorgement sought in
federal court is equitable is more a checklist than a balancing of factors.
Because of these cases, federal courts’ equitable disgorgements had elements of clarity above simmering tension after Liu. Although Liu’s guidance
leaves open questions and may be difficult to apply,121 a court can tell if an
agency is seeking an equitable remedy from the financial remedy’s amount,
purpose, and intended distribution. If any of those suggest the remedy is
punitive or does not benefit those who were wronged, then the requested
remedy is outside the court’s equitable jurisdiction, and the agency needs a
legal basis for the remedy to continue. Provided an agency seeks a remedy
that satisfies Liu’s requirements, Porter and other cases suggest courts have
broad jurisdiction to grant that remedy. Porter, American Stores, and their
progeny noted how equitable powers are greater and more flexible in the
public’s interest than in private suits. Porter and Mitchell also described equitable disgorgements as supporting statutes’ goals and shoring up compliance.
Together, these points give agencies considerable freedom to add restitutionoriented disgorgements to enforcement actions. This sizable authority in
courts and the agencies that bring suits appears to conflict with cases like
Mertens, Meghrig, and Sandoval as those cases stressed statutory text’s limits on
remedies, narrow understandings of congressional intent, and a resistance to
court-created remedies to further a statute. Cases like American Stores may
reconcile these more textual cases with broad Porter-based powers in that government plaintiffs do not need to meet at least some of the jurisdictional
hurdles Mertens, Meghrig, and Sandoval identify for private plaintiffs.122 Still,
this tension speaks to the Court’s evolving approaches to both statutory interrestitution paid to wronged parties. Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1644 (citing Porter, 328 U.S. at
402).
116 See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1946.
117 Id. at 1947–48; see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 253 (1993).
118 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1949.
119 Id. at 1949–50. This principle parallels the binding limitation of equitable remedies
to profits. See id. at 1942–46.
120 Id. at 1946.
121 See, e.g., Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948–49 (flagging open questions about whether disgorgements paid to the Treasury can be for wronged parties’ benefit and therefore consistent
with equitable principles).
122 See infra notes 169–72, 175 and accompanying text.
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pretation and the judiciary’s role, and the Supreme Court has yet to resolve
it.
2.

FTC Circuit Split and Supreme Court Review

Recently, a circuit split has crystallized around FTC disgorgements.
Judges have reached conflicting views on whether the statute authorizing the
FTC to seek permanent federal court injunctions also allows disgorgements
and what the limits on any allowed disgorgements are. At stake are cases that
have ordered defendants to pay hundreds of millions of dollars.123 Two
camps are taking shape. A majority of the circuits with on-point decisions
follow cases like Porter and Mitchell to grant the FTC broad equitable remedies including disgorgements.124 A second camp including the Seventh and
Third Circuits has recently emerged, which reads Porter’s equitable powers
narrowly and emphasizes statutory text. The Supreme Court heard a case on
this matter in January 2021, so it is likely the core of this circuit split will be
resolved soon.
a.

The Ninth Circuit: FTC v. AMG Capital Management

The earliest of the recent cases on FTC disgorgements represents the
majority view and is the case the Supreme Court heard in the October 2020
Term.125 In this case, FTC v. AMG Capital Management, Judge O’Scannlain
for the Ninth Circuit approved of an FTC disgorgement as not inconsistent
with Ninth Circuit precedent and Kokesh, which at the time was the Supreme
Court’s latest word on agency-sought disgorgements.126 With respect to the
123 See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 534 (quoting FTC, THE FTC IN
2009: THE ANNUAL REPORT OF THE FED. TRADE COMM’N 45 (2009) (examining the FTC as
an example of agency litigation because of the scale of its litigation, such as the 83 judgments ordering $371.2 million over March 2008–February 2009); see also FTC v. AbbVie,
Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 338 (3d Cir. 2020) (reviewing a $448 million disgorgement from one
defendant).
124 See FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 779 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted,
2020 WL 3865251 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (No. 19-825), cert. vacated, 2020 WL 6551765 (U.S.
Nov. 9, 2020) (No. 19-825) (citing cases from the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,
and Eleventh Circuits and overturning Seventh Circuit precedent that was consistent with
these other circuits); Brief of the Federal Trade Commission at 28 n.12, FTC v. Credit
Bureau Center, LLC, 937 F.3d 764 (2019) (Nos. 18-2847, 18-3310), 2019 WL 1300373 (citing the Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuit precedents the court’s
opinion cited but also including a First Circuit precedent and an unpublished Third Circuit precedent); Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 533–34, 534 n.158 (summarizing the evolution of the statute and relevant case law with examples).
125 See FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 427 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted,
2020 WL 3865250 (U.S. July 9, 2020) (No. 19-508); Supreme Court of the United States October
Term 2020: For the Session Beginning January 11, 2021, U.S. SUP. CT. (Nov. 25, 2020), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/calendars/
MonthlyArgumentCalJanuary2021.html.
126 See AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 427.
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award of an equitable disgorgement,127 the key question was whether
“injunction” in § 13(b) of the FTC Act permitted the equitable relief without
any mention of disgorgements or general equitable relief.128 This is different from the question in Liu where a statute explicitly allowed the SEC to
seek equitable relief in civil actions and the Court had to determine what that
equitable relief encompassed.129
The Ninth Circuit recognized parallels between the SEC penalty in
Kokesh and this case’s FTC disgorgement.130 Still, a textual challenge to the
scope of the FTC’s authorization in light of Kokesh was “squarely foreclose[d]” by Ninth Circuit precedent.131 That precedent, which followed
earlier Ninth Circuit cases, built on Porter to conclude § 13(b)’s injunctive
relief “invoked the court’s equity jurisdiction,” so the statute permitted courts
to use their “inherent power to deprive defendants of their unjust gains from
past violations, unless the Act restrict[ed] that authority.”132 Because Kokesh
explicitly avoided exploring courts’ authority and because Ninth Circuit precedent emphasized “complete relief” over adherence to equitable relief’s historical bounds, Kokesh and the precedent were not irreconcilable, so the
panel could not overturn the precedent.133
Despite concluding the FTC could seek equitable disgorgements, Judge
O’Scannlain added a special concurrence to argue the Porter-based precedent should be reheard en banc and overturned because of the text and
history.134 Judge O’Scannlain found the definition of “injunction” on its
own and in the context of § 13(b) did not include monetary relief.135 Simi127 The FTC’s case had been bifurcated into a liability phase and a relief phase, and the
circuit court’s opinion began by not overturning the liability phase’s conclusion in the
FTC’s favor. See id. at 422, 426. The opinion then proceeded to consider the relief phase.
See id. at 426.
128 See id. at 426 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) (2018)).
129 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020). Section 13(b), says, “a preliminary
injunction may be granted” if, among other factors, it “would be in the public interest”
after “weighing the equities.” 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Separately, the FTC “may seek . . . [and]
the court may issue, a permanent injunction” if it is “in the interest of the public.” Id.
130 See AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 426.
131 Id.
132 Id. at 427 (quoting FTC v. Com. Planet, Inc., 815 F.3d 593, 598, 599 (9th Cir. 2016))
(recognizing the precedential value of a case that parallels Porter’s language); see Porter v.
Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
133 AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 427. Having found an equitable monetary remedy was
permissible, the court proceeded to assess the amount of that remedy using an approach
Liu later rejected. Compare id. at 427–28 (quoting Com. Planet, 815 F.3d at 603) (measuring
a defendant’s unjust gains as “the defendant’s net revenues . . . , not by the defendant’s net
profits”), with Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1946 (“[C]ourts consistently restricted awards to net profits
from wrongdoing after deducting legitimate expenses.”). The AMG Capital Management
opinion concluded by quickly dispatching a challenge to the term “proper cases.” AMG
Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 428.
134 AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 429 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
135 See id. at 430–31; cf. Ward, supra note 83, at 1191–94 (arguing restitution did not fit
within § 13(b) in light of other sections in the statute).
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lar to Meghrig’s statutory interpretation that limited legal remedies’ range,
Judge O’Scannlain reasoned Congress could have included monetary relief
had it intended such a relief.136 The statutory scheme across different sections of the FTC Act reinforced this conclusion, including how monetary
relief under § 13(b) would sidestep another section’s procedural checks or
render another section redundant.137
Even if “injunction” permitted equitable relief, the FTC disgorgement
matched Kokesh’s characteristics of penalties, and Supreme Court precedent
meant penalties were not equitable remedies.138 Whereas cases on courts’
equitable power deserved historical analysis and such analysis suggested FTC
disgorgements did not resemble equitable remedies, Ninth Circuit precedent
had avoided such analysis in favor of embracing Porter and broad equitable
relief.139 Other circuits matched the Ninth Circuit’s position and lack of satisfactory historical or statutory analysis.140 Judge O’Scannlain concluded by
citing the evolution in the Court’s approach reflected in Sandoval and other
cases that shifted responsibility for defining relief from courts to Congress.141
The concurrence was therefore a call to action to discard a far-reaching reading of Porter that sought “complete relief” in favor of following the
approaches of relatively recent non-FTC cases to confine Porter more narrowly within a statute’s text and equity’s history.
b.

The Seventh Circuit: FTC v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC

Judge O’Scannlain’s opinion was one of the sources cited in the Seventh
Circuit’s 2019 rejection of the Porter-based circuit consensus in FTC v. Credit
Bureau Center, LLC.142 That case overturned a 1989 Seventh Circuit precedent because the precedent did not reflect how cases like Meghrig and Sandoval approached statutory interpretation and courts’ bases for relief.143 On
behalf of the three-judge panel, Judge Sykes traced the 1989 precedent’s origins from Porter and Mitchell to a 1982 Ninth Circuit case that connected
136 See AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 431 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
137 See id. at 432. But see FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d 764, 795–97 (7th Cir.
2019) (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (looking across different sections to identify possible
remedies).
138 See AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 433–34 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (citing Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 422 (1987)). This is consistent with the later Liu
opinion. See Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1941.
139 See AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 434–36 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
140 See id. at 436 (citing cases from the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits
as the only other circuits to “engage with the issue at any length”).
141 See id. at 436–37 (first citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855 (2017); then
citing Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 327 (2015); and then citing
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001)).
142 See 937 F.3d 764, 779, 786 n.4 (7th Cir. 2019). The Supreme Court granted this
case certiorari and consolidated it with FTC v. AMG Capital Management, but it vacated that
grant of certiorari. See supra note 10.
143 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 780–81, 782, 786; cf. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at
436–37 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
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Porter and Mitchell with FTC cases.144 That case led other circuits, including
the Seventh, to infer with little analysis that disgorgements could be an
“ancillary relief” that “was ‘necessary to effectuate the exercise’ of the
[courts’] power to issue an [FTC-requested] injunction” under § 13(b) of the
FTC Act.145 Over time, the Supreme Court had shifted its approach for identifying forms of judicial relief to tools Meghrig exemplified: plain reading of
statutory text, clear and specific purposes of particular statutory sections, and
respect for Congress’s choices to not state or imply particular reliefs.146 On
this basis and the basis of Sandoval’s narrower search for remedies, Porter and
Mitchell may recognize broad equitable powers subject to statutes’ constraints, but courts had identified tighter constraints after the Seventh Circuit
considered FTC disgorgements in 1989.147 The Seventh Circuit used
Meghrig’s approach to statutory interpretation to find equitable disgorgement
was incompatible with § 13(b) as it would lack procedural safeguards.148
In applying cases like Meghrig that concerned private plaintiffs, the court
addressed the criticism that Porter differentiated public and private plaintiffs
by saying that equitable powers are broader in cases involving the public
interest. It did so by concluding the type of plaintiff is irrelevant based on
Porter’s precedent.149 In that precedent, the private parties’ dispute involved
the public interest because it touched on “a matter of public concern” and
statutes related to the subject were “a declaration of public interest and policy.”150 Through that lens, Meghrig’s private dispute over environmental
clean-up costs under a statute involved the public interest too, so Meghrig’s
broad statutory limits and narrow search for implied remedies was not specific to private plaintiffs.151 In other words, the court recognized a greater
scope in which Porter supported enhanced flexibility for equitable powers so
Meghrig’s limitations could cover that entire scope.
144 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 777; see also Ward, supra note 83, at 1192–93
(describing the 1982 Ninth Circuit case as a “botched effort” to reconcile § 13(b) restitution with the rest of the statute). In 2020, Judge Sykes became the Seventh Circuit’s chief
judge. Sykes, Diane S., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/sykes-diane-s
(last visited Dec. 31, 2020).
145 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 778–79 (quoting FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875
F.2d 564, 571, 572 (7th Cir. 1989)); cf. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 436 (O’Scannlain, J.,
specially concurring).
146 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 779–81 (citing Meghrig v. KFC W., Inc., 516 U.S.
479, 484, 485–86 (1996)); cf. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 431 (O’Scannlain, J., specially
concurring).
147 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 782–83. The opinion describes a D.C. Circuit case
that reached a similar conclusion to fit Meghrig within Porter’s caution about statutory limits. Id. at 783 (citing United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1200 (D.C.
Cir. 2005)).
148 See id. at 772–75, 783–84; cf. Ward, supra note 83, at 1191, 1193–94 (arguing
similarly).
149 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 784 (citing Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300
U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
150 Id. (quoting Virginian Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937)).
151 See id. at 784–85.
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The opinion’s approach implicitly assumed Porter carried forward the
prior case’s understanding of the public interest rather than expanding or
refining it, which is a nontrivial assumption for a post-New Deal Court like
Porter’s that built on precedent that was nearly a decade old. The opinion’s
expansive reading of Porter’s “public interest” also had no clear perimeter,
but this haziness also affects the alternative of limiting the public interest to a
nebulous set of subject matters involving a government plaintiff. A Seventh
Circuit precedent reinforced the court’s wide understanding of the public
interest as it treated a government-suit statutory provision the same as the
private-suit provision that Meghrig reviewed, and that comparison meant
Porter-based equitable reliefs under the government-suit provision were
“dead.”152 Weighing stare decisis against these interpretative criticisms of
the Seventh Circuit’s FTC precedent, the court overturned the precedent
and broke from other circuits.153 The Seventh Circuit’s focus on precedents’
evolution contrasted with Judge O’Scannlain’s prioritization of definitions,
equity’s historical uses, and Kokesh’s implications,154 yet both opinions highlight Meghrig-like statutory interpretations that curtail equitable remedies’
reach.
Per Seventh Circuit rules on cases that overturn precedent and create a
circuit split, Credit Bureau Center was circulated among Seventh Circuit judges
for consideration for an en banc review, and a majority did not support such
a review.155 Chief Judge Wood wrote a dissent to this denial of review that
defended the Seventh Circuit’s Porter-based precedent,156 but some of her
arguments are weaker following Liu. She began by examining the scope of
the statute’s explicit remedy. Citing a broad definition of “injunction” and
American Stores’s description of “divestiture” as “a form of injunctive relief”
under “traditional principles of equity,”157 Chief Judge Wood found the
Credit Bureau Center majority “reject[ed] th[e] straightforward reading of the
statute” that would allow the FTC to use any tools under injunction’s wide
umbrella.158 American Stores’s divestiture and Credit Bureau Center’s equitable
restitution were “almost identical” as “both require[d] the wrongdoer to turn
over property that was unlawfully obtained,” so American Stores permitted FTC
disgorgements under § 13(b).159
This argument does not appear valid, especially after Liu. The majority
noted the equitable remedy of “injunction” had a broad definition yet
152 Id. at 785 (quoting United States v. Apex Oil Co., 579 F.3d 734, 737 (7th Cir.
2009)).
153 See id. at 786.
154 The Seventh Circuit’s opinion does not mention Kokesh, which might reflect how
Kokesh was a recent ruling. The opinion’s reliance on precedent like Meghrig that was
more established than Kokesh implicitly bolstered the opinion’s claim that courts’
approaches had shifted substantially since Porter, Mitchell, and even the 1989 precedent.
155 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 767 n.1.
156 See id. at 786–87 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
157 Id. at 788 (quoting California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 275, 281 (1990)).
158 Id. at 787.
159 Id. at 788.
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excluded “other discrete forms of equitable relief like restitution.”160 Cases
like Liu recognized equitable disgorgements within broad statutory language
like “equitable relief” rather than more specific references to injunctions like
§ 13(b)’s.161 Even Porter with its broad equitable powers framed disgorgements within the statute’s “other order” language instead of “injunction” so
that disgorgements were “equitable adjunct[s] to an injunction” or “appropriate and necessary to enforce compliance with” the statute including
injunctions to that end.162 If courts see divestiture as a discrete form of equitable relief, Wood’s American Stores reasoning contradicted these cases by
finding American Stores divestiture within “injunction.”163 Even if courts
granted disgorgements with FTC injunctions as Porter-style equitable
adjuncts, Kokesh and Liu required that equitable disgorgements benefit
wronged parties rather than just punish or strip assets from wrongdoers like
divestiture would.164 Wood’s use of American Stores’s divestitures toward FTC
disgorgements is therefore untenable.
Chief Judge Wood continued by arguing that the Credit Bureau Center
panel conflated cases about who can sue under implied rights of action with
cases about the scope of available remedies.165 Per her argument, cases like
Sandoval are inapplicable to the FTC as the agency had an express right of
action for injunctive relief and was a government plaintiff rather than a private one.166 The latter distinction was important as the government could
enforce laws private actors could not and only it “ha[d] legal authority broad
enough to allow it to carry out [a law’s] mission.”167 Chief Judge Wood was
right that the scope of equitable remedies that agencies can seek is distinct
from implied rights of action, yet Sandoval and related cases illustrated an
interpretative approach and judicial outlook that is not confined to implied
rights of action. Liu’s effort to stay within equity’s historical bounds and not

160 Id. at 771–72 (majority opinion); see FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417,
430–31 (9th Cir. 2017) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring) (finding a similar definition
and exclusions); see also Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 256 (1993) (“‘[E]quitable
relief’ can also refer to those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such
as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).”).
161 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020).
162 Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 399–400 (1946). Mitchell identified its
statute as “Congress entrust[ing] to an equity court the enforcement of prohibitions contained in a regulatory enactment,” so it too does not place disgorgements within the definition of “injunction.” Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 291–92
(1960).
163 See California v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 280–81 (1990).
164 See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
165 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 789 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 789–90.
167 Id. at 790 (quoting F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 170
(2004)) (citing RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2107 (2016) (applying a
limiting presumption to private causes of action but not government ones)).
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discern a broad congressional grant of authority in statutory text was consistent with Sandoval’s hesitation to find implicit causes of action.168
Chief Judge Wood’s distinction between government and private plaintiffs is harder to dismiss. She quoted the American Stores-based reasoning of F.
Hoffman-La Roche that found the government could seek the equitable remedy of divestiture in more cases than private plaintiffs could.169 Even so, the
American Stores Court continued from what F. Hoffman-La Roche quoted to
describe how private plaintiffs must demonstrate injury and standing in ways
the government did not,170 so Chief Judge Wood’s distinction may be more
relevant to plaintiffs’ access to courts than their potential remedies once in
court. Chief Judge Wood also claimed a case that “attach[ed] great weight to
Navy’s interest in realistic training of sailors” was an example of a case that
linked the public interest and whether the plaintiff was part of the government,171 but this is a stretched interpretation.172 Chief Judge Wood’s next
168 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942–46, 1947 (2020) (exploring equity’s history and
denying the argument that Congress incorporated courts’ broad prevailing meaning of
“disgorgement” into statutes); cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 294 (2001) (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (indicating the majority disregarded “prevailing principles of statutory construction” that would permit an implied private cause of action).
169 See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 789 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (quoting F. HoffmanLa Roche Ltd. v. Empagran, 542 U.S. 155, 170 (2004)); California v. Am. Stores Co., 495
U.S. 271, 295–96 (1990) (citing, among other cases, Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515 (1937), which was the basis for Porter’s broadening of equitable
remedies for public interests and led FTC v. Credit Bureau Center to sidestep the distinction
between private and government plaintiffs); supra notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
170 See Am. Stores, 495 U.S. at 295–96.
171 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 793 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (citing Winter v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 26–27 (2008)).
172 The case weighed the Navy’s interest in sonar training exercises against those exercises’ effect on marine mammals and the consequences of those effects. The Court “conclude[d] that the balance of equities and consideration of the overall public interest . . . tip
strongly in favor of the Navy. . . . Of course, military interests do not always trump other
considerations . . . . The lower courts failed properly to defer to senior Navy officers’
specific, predictive judgments” about the case’s issue. Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 26–27 (2008). Chief Judge Wood flagged the weight given to the Navy’s
interests, which appears to refer to the Court’s deference to the Navy’s definition of its
affected interest. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 793 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). However, the
Court’s weighing of military interests against the environmentalists’ (as opposed to
accepting the military’s interests as the public interest) cuts against the government having
particular authority to define the public interest. Chief Judge Wood also posited that disgorgements are distinctly available to government plaintiffs, so the government’s involvement in a case had a key role in defining the public interest. See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d
at 793 (Wood, C.J., dissenting) (first quoting Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643 (2017);
and then quoting FTC v. Bronson Partners, LLC, 654 F.3d 359, 372 (2d Cir. 2011)). The
Second Circuit case Chief Judge Wood cited relied on other circuits’ prior conclusions. See
Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 779, 779 n.3; FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417,
436 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring). Chief Judge Wood countered the majority’s brushing aside of the Second Circuit case by delving into its argument.
That exploration included identifying FTC disgorgements as equitable adjuncts to injunctions and noting FTC disgorgements’ parallels to SEC disgorgements. See Credit Bureau
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argument of note was a challenge to the Credit Bureau Center majority’s reliance on Meghrig and related cases on implied remedies.173 First, Meghrig was
irrelevant to considerations of equitable remedies since its analysis involved
straightforward statutory interpretation without exploring equity’s scope.174
With respect to Meghrig’s scope, Chief Judge Wood is correct that it did not
include a Liu-like examination of equitable remedies and did not concern
FTC authorizations. However, it showed an approach to statutory interpretation for implied remedies that mirrored contemporary cases’ textualism and
offered the majority one roadmap for assessing FTC remedies’ scope.
Second, the Credit Bureau Center majority cited a slew of cases to claim “a
sweeping rejection of implied remedies,” but these cases all had critical distinctions from cases like Credit Bureau Center.175 Like Meghrig, these cases are
more applicable if the majority was correct that there is no meaningful distinction between government and private plaintiffs. Furthermore, Chief
Judge Wood stressed the cited cases’ scopes while the majority emphasized
their methodologies and conclusions.176 Relying on equity’s history more
than details from statutes’ text, Liu separated disgorgements into those that
were penalties and those that were equitable. Despite not grounding its distinction in the sort of textual analysis Credit Bureau Center did, Liu could illustrate a possible middle ground between Credit Bureau Center’s elimination of
implied remedies and Chief Judge Wood’s disregard for Meghrig-style
searches for statutory limits: courts can segment one type of remedy by the
remedy’s case-specific characteristics.
The Supreme Court removed Credit Bureau Center from its docket,177 but
that case’s arguments may inform how the Court resolves Judge
O’Scannlain’s two AMG Capital Management opinions. In reaching a similar
conclusion to Judge O’Scannlain’s special concurrence, Credit Bureau Center
provided a more detailed history of how the current majority emerged and
Ctr., 937 F.3d at 794–95 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). Porter supported disgorgements as equitable adjuncts, but Kokesh and Liu identified much of the SEC’s disgorgements as inequitable. See supra sub-subsection I.B.1.c. Chief Judge Wood’s quote from Kokesh supported
Kokesh’s conclusion that SEC disgorgements were oriented on enforcement over victim
compensation and so were penalties. See Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 793 (quoting
Kokesh, 137 S. Ct. at 1643). Since Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1941 (2020) treated penalties
as legal remedies (rather than equitable ones) and the public interest’s scope is relevant to
Porter’s guidance for equitable remedies, Chief Judge Wood’s argument blurs post-Liu
legal and equitable realms.
173 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 792, 793–94 (Wood, C.J., dissenting). Chief Judge
Wood argued just before this that one of the majority’s precedents was irrelevant because
the Court’s hesitation to grant the remedy centered on the case’s type of class action suit.
Since the defendant Credit Bureau “must merely turn over to the FTC a single lump
sum[,] . . . [this transfer wa]s the end of the court’s involvement with the equitable relief in
this case.” Id. at 791–92. Liu’s concern about disgorgements benefitting wronged parties
invalidated this argument. See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1948 (2020).
174 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 792 (Wood, C.J., dissenting).
175 See id. at 793–94.
176 Compare id., with id. at 781–82 (majority opinion).
177 See supra note 10.
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added more precedents to argue the Court had shifted to Meghrig’s methodology. It also punctured the uncertain barrier between cases like Porter with
government plaintiffs and cases like Meghrig with private plaintiffs. Chief
Judge Wood’s dissent included stronger legal analysis than Judge
O’Scannlain included in the Ninth Circuit ruling. Chief Judge Wood’s most
compelling parts were her defense of equitable powers’ greater scope for
government plaintiffs and her challenges to the relevance of the majority’s
precedents. If the Court supports Chief Judge Wood’s and some circuits’
distinction between types of plaintiffs, Credit Bureau Center’s reasoning for
denying FTC disgorgements would be weaker but might still triumph as its
textual approach resembles how the Court tackled subjects like implied
rights of action. If the Court agrees with Credit Bureau Center and applies
Meghrig to government plaintiff cases, Porter would apply to cases with nongovernment plaintiffs to the extent it applies anywhere, the Court could still
deem some of Credit Bureau Center’s cited cases irrelevant, and the Court
could trace its own narrative across cases like it did in Liu.178
c.

The Third Circuit: FTC v. AbbVie

In September 2020, the Third Circuit joined the Seventh Circuit in
opposing courts’ ability to grant disgorgements to the FTC under § 13(b) of
the FTC Act.179 In FTC v. AbbVie, Inc., Judge Hardiman described the relevant sections of the statute and then immediately contextualized the key
§ 13(b) language using the history-focused Liu opinion and the textual
Meghrig opinion.180 Like Judge O’Scannlain’s special concurrence and Credit
Bureau Center, AbbVie found the statute’s text did not support disgorgements
following both § 13(b)’s context and a limited definition of “injunction.”181
The Third Circuit then noted its circuit precedents supporting § 13(b) disgorgements were not binding before praising Credit Bureau Center as “thorough and well-reasoned.”182 Next, the opinion rejected the FTC’s argument
that statutory amendments changed § 13(b)’s remedies or referred to restitution as a § 13(b) remedy.183
178 See supra notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
179 See FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 374–79, 381 (3d Cir. 2020).
180 Id. at 375.
181 See id. at 376–77 (citing Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 775); FTC v. AMG Cap.
Mgmt., LLC, 910 F.3d 417, 430–32 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring);
Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 772–75; cf. Ward, supra note 83, at 1191, 1191–94 (arguing
restitution was incompatible with § 13(b)’s context).
182 See AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 377 (citing Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 764, 785; AMG Cap.
Mgmt., 910 F.3d at 429 (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring)). This included a conclusion
that the relevant portion of a Third Circuit precedent was unbinding dictum. Id. (citing
FTC v. Mag. Sols., LLC, 432 F. App’x 155, 158 n.2 (3d Cir. 2011)).
183 Id. at 377; cf. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 775 (reaching the same conclusion using
similar reasoning in the lead-up to its core analysis of precedents’ evolution and Meghrig’s
applicability).
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With such comparatively simple arguments addressed, AbbVie proceeded
to assess how Porter and Mitchell’s broad equitable powers as applied in the
Third Circuit fit with the question presented.184 After summarizing Porter
and Mitchell, the court described a 2005 Third Circuit case that understood
those cases as “chart[ing] an analytical course . . . : (1) a district court sitting
in equity may order restitution unless there is a clear statutory limitation on
the district court’s equitable jurisdiction and powers; and (2) restitution is
permitted only where it furthers the purposes of the statute.”185 Whereas
statutes like Porter’s and Mitchell’s included vague terms like “other order” or
“restrain violations” and thereby did not limit courts’ equitable power,
§ 13(b) included no such vagueness by specifying that injunctions were the
appropriate equitable remedy.186 The statute therefore had “a clear statutory limitation on the district court’s equitable jurisdiction and powers”
under the Third Circuit’s Porter and Mitchell framework that was in addition
to limits in the section’s context and the statutory scheme.187 The statute
therefore barred courts from granting disgorgements.
One possible criticism of this approach is that it flipped Porter’s presumption when it allowed the government to seek a disgorgement. Porter
presumed courts’ equitable powers were available unless a statute blocked
them while AbbVie presumed the statute’s listed remedies are the complete
list of available remedies unless Congress added a vague term.188 A counter
to this is that it is unclear what would satisfy Porter’s “necessary and inescapable inference”189 if a list of specific remedies does not, especially if current cases gravitate nearer Sandoval-like textualism than Mitchell-like
purposivism as Credit Bureau Center argued.190
AbbVie’s decision against the FTC on the basis of the Third Circuit’s
Porter and Mitchell framework contrasts with how Judge O’Scannlain’s special
concurrence and Credit Bureau Center approached Porter and Mitchell. The
special concurrence only cited Porter as the basis for the precedent it wanted
to overturn.191 Credit Bureau Center framed Porter as the foundation of creep184 AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 377–79.
185 Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 225 (3d Cir.
2005)); cf. Ward, supra note 83, at 1190 (identifying a similar pair of requirements).
186 See AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 379; supra notes 70–71, 75–76 and accompanying text; see also
Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1940 (2020) (examining the scope of disgorgements under a
statute’s “equitable relief”); cf. Ward, supra note 83, at 1194–95, 1197 (identifying FTC
disgorgements as outside Porter and Mitchell’s scope due to material differences in the statutes, yet finding those differences in their operation rather than in the wording of
remedies).
187 AbbVie, 976 F.3d at 378–79.
188 Id.; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
189 FTC v. Credit Bureau Ctr., LLC, 937 F.3d 764, 776 (7th Cir. 2019) (quoting Porter,
328 U.S. at 398).
190 Id. at 779–81 (identifying a statute’s list of remedies as implicitly barring other
remedies).
191 FTC v. AMG Cap. Mgmt., 910 F.3d 417, 435 (9th Cir. 2018) (O’Scannlain, J., specially concurring).
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ing precedents, an example of outdated statutory interpretation, and a case
that clashed with more recent cases like Meghrig.192
Credit Bureau Center’s simplistic reference to the Third Circuit case that
identified that circuit’s Porter framework offers one way to reconcile Credit
Bureau Center’s FTC-restricting outcome with Porter. Based on that reference,
AbbVie’s Third Circuit precedent limited Meghrig’s reluctance to find implied
remedies to elaborate remedial schemes.193 This would mean AbbVie implicitly recognized the FTC’s remedial scheme including § 13(b) as simpler than
the scheme in Meghrig, so Porter and Mitchell’s limitations on equitable remedies applied while Meghrig’s did not. This would be an incomplete read of
the Third Circuit’s precedent and how AbbVie did not examine § 13(b) with
Meghrig.
Instead of focusing on the complexity of the remedial scheme, AbbVie’s
Third Circuit precedent distinguished Meghrig from Porter and Mitchell for
several reasons that meant Meghrig did not apply to FTC disgorgements while
Porter and Mitchell did. Meghrig involved a citizen-suit remedy instead of an
enforcement action, Meghrig’s statute imposed greater restrictions on equitable powers than Porter’s and Mitchell’s did, and Meghrig’s proposed remedy
resembled damages more than equitable restitution.194 AbbVie’s identification of statutory limitations paralleled part of the analysis that had differentiated Meghrig.195 AbbVie’s outcome offers the Supreme Court a way to deny
FTC disgorgements in AMG Capital Management by using Porter and Mitchell
separate from Judge O’Scannlain’s textual and historical analysis and Credit
Bureau Center’s application of Meghrig under a broad definition of Porter’s
public interest.
d.

Possible Outcomes of AMG Capital Management’s Supreme Court
Ruling

Faced with AMG Capital Management’s question of whether courts can
grant the FTC disgorgements under § 13(b) of the FTC Act’s authorization
of injunctions, the Supreme Court can reach one of three conclusions. It
could say that statutes specifically authorizing injunctions categorically allow
disgorgements, sometimes allow disgorgements, or categorically prohibit
disgorgements.
A categorical approval would support the circuit split’s majority position
that traces back to the Supreme Court’s Porter decision that recognized
courts’ broad equitable powers.196 It would also support other agencies’ pur192 Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at 777–78, 779–80, 782.
193 See id. at 782–83; United States v. Lane Labs-USA, Inc., 427 F.3d 219, 232 (3d Cir.
2005).
194 Lane Labs-USA, 427 F.3d at 231.
195 See FTC v. AbbVie Inc., 976 F.3d 327, 379 (3d Cir. 2020) (finding the specification
of one equitable remedy bars other equitable remedies); cf. Credit Bureau Ctr., 937 F.3d at
782 (saying some circuits “have concluded that a statute displaces equitable authority when
it specifies a particular remedy”).
196 See supra sub-subsection I.B.2.c.
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suits of disgorgements like the Introduction’s OCC hypothetical. However,
Porter’s reasoning in light of Judge O’Scannlain’s AMG Capital Management
special concurrence, Credit Bureau Center, and AbbVie suggest that most circuits stretched Porter’s bounds.197 Additionally, Liu’s overall approach, selective quoting of Porter, and lack of references to Mitchell’s quest for “complete
relief”198 suggest the AMG Capital Management Court will again build its equitable remedies argument forward from equity’s history rather than backward
from § 13(b)’s purpose. This would mirror the Court’s evolution from Mitchell’s purposivist era to more recent textual cases like Sandoval.199 On the
matter of Sandoval and its limit on implied rights of action, an unequivocal
ruling in the FTC’s favor would probably be limited to government plaintiffs
under the majority definition of Porter’s public interest to avoid friction with
Sandoval and other private implied rights of action cases. Liu explored the
boundaries of equitable disgorgements while AMG Capital Management
explores whether such disgorgements are available at all, but that distinction
is unlikely to support AMG Capital Management using an approach that is substantially different from Liu. Liu and the recent circuit opinions therefore
indicate that categorical support of FTC disgorgements is unlikely.
A ruling between categorical support of FTC disgorgements and categorical denial of them is more likely than categorical support but is far from
assured. Just as Liu recently used historical disgorgements to find that some
SEC disgorgements are equitable and some are not,200 AMG Capital Management could conclude § 13(b) supports some FTC disgorgements but not
others. The Court could reach this conclusion by combining the views of
Credit Bureau Center and Chief Judge Wood’s Credit Bureau Center dissent.
Credit Bureau Center found that a number of cases together supported a thorough search for statutory restrictions on courts’ equitable powers in the manner of the Supreme Court’s Meghrig decision, and Chief Judge Wood argued
these cases were materially different from Credit Bureau Center’s situation.201
The Court could find that some of Credit Bureau Center’s comparisons are
valid and others are not, which would allow courts to read § 13(b)’s and similar statutes’ limitations differently in different situations. For example, the
Court could agree with Chief Judge Wood that Porter’s availability of courts’
equitable powers is greater for government plaintiffs than for private plaintiffs when both seek injunctions, so Meghrig’s restraint is not as applicable to
§ 13(b) as Credit Bureau Center believed. A conclusion in this direction might
provide a compromise between justices, but it would create potentially complicated caveats subject to courts’ edits. This approach also risks a creeping
expansion of certain situations’ relief, which Credit Bureau Center criticized.202
197
198
199
200
201
202

Id.
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 103–04, 109–12 and accompanying text.
sub-subsection I.B.1.b.
notes 103–08 and accompanying text.
notes 146–47, 173–76 and accompanying text.
notes 144–45 and accompanying text.
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Alternatively, the Court could allow some FTC disgorgements by distinguishing Meghrig from the less restrictive Porter and Mitchell opinions. It
could follow some or all of the ways the Third Circuit differentiated those
cases in AbbVie and its precedents,203 or the Court could create its own. A
result from balancing Porter, Mitchell, and Meghrig might be neater than one
from wading through all the cases Credit Bureau Center cited, but it would still
be a potentially complicated and creeping set of caveats.
On the basis of the recent relevant opinions, the Supreme Court’s most
probable ruling on AMG Capital Management is to deny disgorgements when a
statute only refers to injunctions. Despite the numerous circuit precedents
and Chief Justice Wood’s defense of them in her Credit Bureau Center dissent,
the Judge O’Scannlain AMG Capital Management special concurrence, Credit
Bureau Center, and AbbVie offer strong arguments against the FTC’s position.
This is especially true after Liu identified constraints on equitable remedies.
Each of those three opinions against the FTC emphasized its own facet
of the text and history to reach its conclusion. Judge O’Scannlain’s focus on
FTC disgorgements’ compatibility with historical equitable remedies204 could
support a Supreme Court ruling that does not explore Porter and Mitchell
much. This could be consistent with how Liu quoted Porter only briefly and
incompletely since both Liu and the new ruling could represent an implicit
paring back of Porter. As Porter dies a slow, quiet death, though, courts may
have trouble telling to what extent it remains good law.
A ruling that embraces Credit Bureau Center would remove the barriers
between Porter and cases like Meghrig, so it would spread Porter to more types
of cases but restrain its significance in those cases.205 Given the breadth of
the restrictions Credit Bureau Center identified as it connected Porter with an
earlier case,206 a Supreme Court decision in this direction should identify the
extent to which Porter clarified or focused courts’ equitable power instead of
just following historical practice.
The Court could instead rule against the FTC following a less disruptive
path offered by AbbVie. That path applies Porter and Mitchell, focuses on the
statute’s text and context, and keeps Meghrig’s reluctance to find implied
remedies away from cases like AMG Capital Management.207 This option is
particularly attractive as it uses a simple textual analysis of statutes’ stated
remedies and does not tinker with Porter, Mitchell, or Meghrig. However, the
Justices may favor a bolder outcome that cleans up the law if they agree with
Credit Bureau Center that courts have moved beyond the philosophies underlying Porter and Mitchell.208
So, what do the cases from Porter through AMG Capital Management
mean for the government’s ability to sue on citizens’ behalf? Liu stated
203
204
205
206
207
208

See
See
See
See
See
See

supra
supra
supra
supra
supra
supra

notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
sub-subsection I.B.2.a.
sub-subsection I.B.2.b.
notes 149–51 and accompanying text.
sub-subsection I.B.2.c.
notes 146–48 and accompanying text.
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courts can grant typically available equitable remedies like injunctions and,
within several constraints, disgorgements.209 Per the most likely outcome of
the Supreme Court’s AMG Capital Management decision in which it rules
against the FTC, statutes concerning agency suits in federal courts limit agencies’ available remedies to what the statute specifically authorizes unless the
statute permits a broad type of relief like “equitable relief,” “other order,” or
actions that “restrain violations.”210 The extent to which government plaintiffs are entitled to greater exercise of courts’ equitable powers may depend
on the Court’s approach to deciding against the FTC. Under either AbbVie
or a version of Credit Bureau Center that adds Chief Judge Wood’s differentiation of government plaintiffs, Porter supports a special status for government
plaintiffs to act in the public interest and therefore benefit from a fuller
range of courts’ equitable powers. Under Judge O’Scannlain’s logic or a full
adoption of Credit Bureau Center, government plaintiffs may lack such a special status. Despite this uncertainty, these outcomes reflect what remedies an
agency can seek from a federal court. They say little about how an agency
chooses to seek particular remedies or the process an agency follows when it
pursues an allowed remedy (e.g., how it calculates disgorgements for victims’
benefits). Liu’s concern that equitable disgorgements benefit victims211
added an element of agencies’ process into the definition of equitable remedies, so the Court is wary about agencies’ processes but has avoided giving
more than loose standards.
II. SHORTCOMINGS
A.

OF

AGENCIES’ VICTIM RESTITUTION SUITS

Existing Scholarship’s Theoretical Concerns

Several authors have looked beyond what government plaintiffs can seek
for victims to raise concerns with how government plaintiffs approach such
suits. Many of these concerns fall into one of three buckets. First, government victim restitution lawsuits risk removing the victims’ role in pursuing
their claims. Second, as the government develops its case strategy, it has a
variety of incentives other than ensuring victims receive the full extent of
their valid claims. Third, government cases’ inner workings and procedures
have little guidance for how the government represents a case and distributes
funds. The parens patriae cases described in Section I.A of this Note say little
on a case’s mechanics once a government actor has standing.212 Section
209 See Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1942–46 (2020).
210 Id. at 1940; Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 397–98 (1946); Mitchell v.
Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 289 (1960) (citation omitted); see supra note
186 and accompanying text.
211 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1948.
212 See supra Section I.A. One exception is how a few circuits presume a parens patriae
plaintiff adequately represented its subdivisions and citizens, United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics Corp., 749 F.2d 968, 984–88 (2d Cir. 1984), which amplifies rather than
diminishes the reason to assess how and how well the government provides that
representation.
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I.B’s cases on federal courts’ equitable power to grant remedies show that
equitable disgorgements must benefit victims, but they otherwise say little
about how agencies manage these cases and remedies.213 These process criticisms are then distinct from the previous Sections’ debates and precedents.
1.

Victim Input on Their Claims

With respect to the risk of eliminating victim input and autonomy, government suits can prevent victims from seeking private lawsuits or sideline
their participation in litigation. For victims in many situations, this may be a
minor issue because private litigation is “unavailable or impractical,” so lawsuits brought by government actors like the SEC might be victims’ only feasible avenue for restitution.214 In fact, one study of SEC distributions to
victims found that over half had no parallel private litigation.215 Government lawsuits can therefore resemble private class action lawsuits that give
victims access to adjudication and “serve[ ] an important democratic function, allowing groups of individuals to collectively petition and redress widespread harm.”216 That being said, victims who would not pursue private
litigation would want the government case to provide fair remedies.217 If the
government plaintiff drives the case with minimal victim input, there is a risk
that the proceeding is not fair and transparent to all victims and that victims
will not receive the potential psychological benefits of active participation.218
Government actions can also hamper victims’ access to courts and judicial restitution by jeopardizing whatever private litigation the victims bring.
The American Bar Association and other organizations have claimed some
FTC disgorgements “duplicate or distort remedies available in private litigation,”219 and the government may give victims access to a public settlement
fund it arranged outside of litigation only if the victims “waive the right to
sue.”220 If the government and the victims pursue independent cases, this
213 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
214 Urska Velikonja, Public Compensation for Private Harm: Evidence from the SEC’s Fair
Fund Distributions, 67 STAN. L. REV. 331, 336 (2015).
215 See id. at 371 (attributing the lack of private actions to victims not filing them and to
courts dismissing cases before reaching their merits).
216 Adam S. Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, 59 DUKE L.J. 1105, 1116 (2010) [hereinafter Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality].
217 See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 509–12 (discussing objectives of
private class action settlements).
218 See Stephanie Bornstein, Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation, 104 MINN. L. REV.
811, 829 (2019) (discussing the potential disconnect between a large number of class
action victims and their shared lawyers); Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, supra note 216,
at 1108 (discussing these issues in the context of public compensation funds created
outside of court and class action settlements). While these sources do not describe government lawsuits at these points in their arguments, their theoretical concerns for cases that
aggregate victims’ claims are relevant to government actions on behalf of a group of
victims.
219 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 535.
220 Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, supra note 216, at 1119.

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL414.txt

2021]

unknown

Seq: 35

9-APR-21

how federal agencies sue on victims’ behalf

18:09

1683

could result in contradictory decisions and interpretations in addition to
“confusion over the preclusive effect of judgments by alternative enforcers.”221 Given courts’ aversion to redundant cases that reduce courts’ efficiency and risk multiple awards over one set of behavior,222 courts may have
good reasons not to hear a victim’s private litigation if the victim’s claim is in
the scope of a government lawsuit. For reasons like these, advocates for
potential defendants have argued that certain government lawsuits eliminate
the need to allow private litigation, and the Supreme Court has cited agency
lawsuits as a policy reason not to expand a type of liability to private
lawsuits.223
2.

Agency Litigators’ Objectives

Limited input into a government case or preclusion from bringing a private claim might not be a substantial concern to victims if the government’s
goals in its case align with the victims’. However, it is clear government plaintiffs have objectives besides ensuring each victim receives what is fair. One of
those is the government’s goal of enforcing the law and deterring wrongdoing. The SEC’s prioritization of enforcement over victim restitution
informed the Kokesh Court’s ruling that certain disgorgements were penalties, so the law’s highest levels recognize government plaintiffs’ varied objectives.224 If there are enough victims or the wrongdoing has implications that
affect a substantial segment of the population, the government could have a
distinct quasi-sovereign interest in enforcement that, if the government actor
were a state, would support a parens patriae lawsuit.225
An enforcement goal in a lawsuit in addition to the goal of righting victims’ wrongs is not strictly bad. One of the benefits of class action litigation is
its ability to have a deterrent effect, especially on large defendants that cause
diffuse injuries,226 and similar deterrence by a public suit may prevent future
wrongdoing. However, the government’s enforcement interest may not align
with winning victims’ full claims. Government prosecutors have at times prioritized reforming defendants’ practices over holding defendants accountable.227 Furthermore, a government actor may have political reasons not to
enforce laws in a manner that causes high-level officials to rein in the actor’s
autonomy.228 Application of or shifts in the government’s approach to
enforcement may result in outcomes that are subject to limited judicial
221 Bornstein, supra note 218, at 825–26.
222 Id. at 828.
223 See Barbara Black, Should the SEC Be a Collection Agency for Defrauded Investors?, 63 BUS.
LAW. 317, 319 (2008).
224 See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017); supra sub-subsection I.B.1.c
(describing the case and its relation to other cases).
225 See supra subsection I.A.1.
226 See Zimmerman, Funding Irrationality, supra note 216, at 1116.
227 See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 21, at 1394.
228 See Margaret H. Lemos & Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L.
REV. 853, 878 (2014).
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review,229 which can be dangerous to victims’ interests if, as described above,
government actions block private pursuit of those interests.
While enforcement considerations can lead government plaintiffs to
seek less than the total of victims’ claims, they could lead government plaintiffs to seek large judgments in ways that do not match victims’ goals. A judgment for victims gives the government actor that earned it a quantified, easily
published, and readily comparable measure of the actor’s effort and effectiveness.230 Government plaintiffs can demonstrate their importance to their
stakeholders by citing a high number of such judgments or the size of those
judgments.231 Federal agencies publish and present these numbers when
they compile their annual reports, testify to Congress, or advocate for their
budgets.232 There is also evidence that some agencies draw particular attention to their enforcement action statistics when they are under greater scrutiny and are trying to build their reputation as enforcers.233 On one hand,
incentives that encourage potential government plaintiffs to enforce laws vigorously and undo victims’ harm can boost the quantity of victims that receive
restitution and the quality of each victim’s restitution.
On the other hand, those incentives can encourage government plaintiffs to pursue cases in a manner that amplifies the plaintiff’s statistics, potentially at victims’ expense. A plaintiff like an agency looking to amplify its
numbers may favor easy cases over complicated ones, and that plaintiff could
be faster than victims to settle a case for the sake of quick headlines or
annual totals.234 The low rate at which government cases collect on their
penalties indicates that government plaintiffs at least sometimes prioritize
reputation-boosting, readily published penalty assessments over the actual
receipt of the funds.235 One 2011 survey of agency collection rates found
that agencies typically collect “well below 50%” of what they were owed, and
some agencies collected far less than that.236 Although that scholarship concerned penalties that government actors passed along to general treasury
229 See Zimmerman & Jaros, supra note 21, at 1400–01, 1406 (discussing this concern in
the context of criminal actions by federal prosecutors and describing federal prosecutors’
increased focus on restitution after some corporate fraud scandals).
230 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 876.
231 See id. at 877.
232 See id. at 874, 881 (describing how “[f]ederal agencies tout their enforcement successes to the most important decisionmaker, Congress, and do so in the budget context”).
233 See id. at 882–83.
234 See id. at 890, 897, 900 (describing the potential drawbacks and benefits of government actors having financial or reputational incentives in lawsuits); Bornstein, supra note
218, at 825 n.69 (quoting Zachary D. Clopton, Redundant Public-Private Enforcement, 69
VAND. L. REV. 285, 328–29 (2016) (considering how parallel private and public litigation
over one set of wrongdoing can lead “enforcers . . . to cut corners, strike sweetheart deals,
or engage in inefficient gamesmanship”)).
235 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 884, 886.
236 Ezra Ross & Martin Pritikin, The Collection Gap: Underenforcement of Corporate and
White-Collar Fines and Penalties, 29 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 453, 475–76 (2011). Some of the
discussed agencies subsequently had periods of higher collection rates, but those may have
had idiosyncratic explanations. See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 884–85.
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funds,237 it is conceivable that analogous incentives would lead a government
suing for victims to prioritize headline-worthy settlement and judgments over
extended processes like fund collection and distribution. Because government plaintiffs might care most about the numbers Congress sees and victims
care most about the numbers in their bank accounts, a shared interest in
large outcomes is not enough to ensure government plaintiffs fully represent
the claims of their lawsuits’ victims.
Government plaintiffs could have additional, selfish incentives in addition to the enforcement, political, and stakeholder incentives that may influence their actions. If there are parallel public and private cases about the
same wrongdoing, there is a risk that both plaintiffs will shirk responsibility
for investing the time and resources to build a case or press certain arguments.238 Even if there is no parallel litigation, government litigators whose
jobs and paychecks do not depend on their cases’ success might not invest as
much energy in a case as a private attorney.239 They could also tailor the
case in ways that reflect their personal preferences and career prospects
rather the government’s or victims’ goals.240 Of course, private attorneys can
also underperform or improperly prioritize their personal benefits, but victims stand a better chance of catching and rectifying such behavior in their
lawyers than in the government’s lawyers, especially if a government plaintiff
is not transparent with victims.
3.

Comparatively Few Procedures

Because government-brought cases can decrease victims’ access to courts
and juggle a host of interests besides victim compensation, it would be reasonable to expect government entities that often sue on victims’ behalf to
have extensive procedures for these cases. In addition to that, the parallels
between an administrative agency’s victim restitution and a class action settlement fund suggest the former’s procedures would be at least as robust as the
latter’s.241 This suggestion has become stronger as the government has
taken a more active role in victim compensation in recent decades, which has
blurred the line between public and private enforcement.242
This expectation of comprehensive government procedures would be
mistaken. Government plaintiffs like federal agencies can learn from the
established procedures and safeguards for class action suits.243 In the con237 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 886.
238 See Bornstein, supra note 218, at 825.
239 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 889.
240 See id. at 889, 891 (describing the risks of government lawyers drifting away from
agency goals and third parties capturing influence over government lawyers).
241 See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 512.
242 See Lemos & Minzner, supra note 228, at 862.
243 See, e.g., Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 1, at 1999 (examining adjudication processes within agencies and how they can improve by aggregating claims in a manner resembling class action suits). Professor Zimmerman has written about the lessons
class action can teach agencies in several articles.
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text of agency suits for victims, Adam Zimmerman noted how courts check if
“large representative settlements” like class action settlements allow absent
parties to participate, possess a “harmony of interests between the class representative and other parties,” and preclude private litigation.244 Part of
courts’ review of these suits is an assessment of the aggregated claims’ variation (i.e., how similar the claims are) and viability (i.e., do class members
have the means and incentive to litigate on their own).245 Professor Zimmerman’s reference to state attorney general actions facing these same checks246
dovetails with how some parens patriae cases are concerned about the parens
patriae providing adequate representation.247 Relative to class action suits,
courts owe agencies greater flexibility and discretion as they exercise
prosecutorial discretion and allocate their resources.248
Still, the potential shortcomings of agency procedures are concerning.
The SEC, for example, had some procedures that paralleled class action settlements’ procedures for distributing funds.249 However, distributions following those procedures did “not provide victims an active role in the
distribution plan’s design, receive consistent judicial review, or follow regular
guidelines to determine when recouped funds should go to the U.S. Treasury.”250 The FTC similarly had limited procedures and safeguards,251 and
the FDA has sent hundreds of millions of dollars of restitution to the U.S.
Treasury instead of victims under its loose standards for doing so.252 These
agencies may have changed their procedures since Zimmerman reviewed
them, especially after Kokesh and Liu referred to funds’ distribution as they
parsed agencies’ authorization.253 Such revisions might address immediate
concerns without offering a comprehensive improvement to victim access or
conflicting interests. A considerable amount of literature has examined the
interplay of victims’ claims and public enforcement, which has led scholars to
propose promising solutions within agencies and states.254 However, the
244 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 514.
245 See id. at 516–17.
246 See id. at 514.
247 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
248 See Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 551.
249 See id. at 532.
250 Id. at 530–33 (describing the issues and an instance in which the SEC’s distribution
of a wrongdoer’s assets “arguably frustrated the remedies available to creditors in
bankruptcy”).
251 See id. at 535–36.
252 See id. at 536–39 (describing a 2003 case in which the FDA deposited $500 million of
victim restitution with the Treasury with a court’s approval).
253 See Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1644 (2017); Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1948–49
(2020) supra sub-subsection I.B.1.c. Kokesh and Liu involved the SEC and narrowed the
acceptable scope of SEC disgorgements. AMG Capital Management is likely to restrain FTC
disgorgements. See supra sub-subsection I.B.2.d. These three decisions may have
prompted or might prompt agencies to revise their procedures.
254 See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 218, at 813, 836 (citing much of this literature and
proposing a model of “co-equal, co-counselstyle collaboration” between public and private
attorneys when statutes authorize action by both agencies and individuals); Myriam Gilles
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ongoing development of Supreme Court case law about federal agencies’
remedies mean this literature has not yet combined the latest cases in that
field with existing doctrines like parens patriae and procedural
recommendations.
B.

An Empirical Check: Date Distributions of SEC Administrative Proceedings
Reflect Goals Beyond Compensating Victims and Enforcement

In the previous subsection, one of the potential issues with government
plaintiffs advancing victims’ claims is that the plaintiffs may have objectives in
the case and fund distribution that conflict with victims’ goals. As an illustration of how agencies may have interests other than the compensation of victims when they seek disgorgements, Figures 2 and 3 highlight several
patterns in the timing of orders related to certain funds the SEC operates for
the benefit of harmed investors. Following a statutory evolution that began
in 1990, current federal statutes allow the SEC to place disgorgements and
civil penalties in such funds.255 That evolution shifted the SEC from treating
disgorgements as pure enforcement actions that benefitted the U.S. Treasury
to treating them as both enforcement actions and victim compensation.256
The SEC has sought money for these compensation funds through federal courts or administrative proceedings.257 Based on the SEC’s history of
collecting and distributing billions of dollars each year, the SEC arguably has
& Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility v Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 669–72 (2012) (advocating for states to increase their use of
their parens patriae authority by hiring private attorneys).
255 A federal court first recognized the SEC’s ability to seek disgorgements from
defendants in 1971. Congress codified this and nudged the SEC toward using disgorgements for nonenforcement goals like benefitting victims with the Penny Stock Reform Act
of 1990, which “expressly authorized the SEC to design rules for the distribution of such
awards.” Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 527–28 (first citing SEC v. Tex.
Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971) (showing the SEC could seek
disgorgements in federal court); and then citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2018)).
The cited statute subsections have not substantively changed since that article’s publication. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e) (“In any proceeding in which the Commission . . . may impose
a penalty under this section, the Commission . . . may enter an order requiring accounting
and disgorgement”), 78u-3(e) (“In any cease-and-desist proceeding [by the Commission]
under subsection (a), the Commission may enter an order requiring accounting and disgorgement.”). The Fair Funds Act within the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 as amended by
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 expanded this
power as the SEC can pursue “any equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for
the benefit of investors.” Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 529 n.129 (quoting still-current language from 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5) (2018)). Those acts also allow the
SEC to add “a civil penalty” from “any judicial or administrative action brought by the
Commission under the securities laws” to a disgorgement fund. 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2018);
see Black, supra note 223, at 324–27 (describing the Fair Funds Act and limitations on it
that are no longer in the statute); Velikonja, supra note 214, at 341–42.
256 Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, supra note 5, at 520.
257 Velikonja, supra note 214, at 350–51 (“Between 2002 and 2013, the SEC ordered
$14.46 billion distributed through 243 fair funds, of which 143 were created in judicial

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-4\NDL414.txt

1688

unknown

Seq: 40

notre dame law review

9-APR-21

18:09

[vol. 96:4

“the most extensive and sustained effort by a public agency to compensate
the victims of misconduct.”258 In fiscal year 2020 (October 2019–September
2020) alone, “parties in the [SEC’s] actions and proceedings were ordered to
pay a total of $3.589 billion in disgorgement of ill-gotten gains,” and the SEC
“returned $602 million to harmed investors” across ninety-one funds and
administrators.259 Even though the Supreme Court ruled that SEC disgorgements like Kokesh’s are penalties that have punishment and deterrence as
goals ahead of victim compensation,260 the SEC’s disgorgements offer perhaps the most thorough and accessible set of records related to an agency’s
victim-compensating actions.
The SEC’s efforts to collect money for victims through federal courts are
within this Note’s focus, and its efforts to achieve a similar goal through
administrative proceedings are not. However, there is no consolidated
database of records for court-ordered funds and their disbursements, and the
SEC’s website compiles all orders for funds created through administrative
proceedings.261 Examined at a high level, these administrative proceeding
orders can reflect agency-wide strategies or resource allocations without the
need to construct a database of court proceedings. Despite the potential
benefit to the literature from such a database, the SEC plans to soon launch
an internal Disgorgement and Penalties System,262 and this might allow it to
start publishing an official case list like its administrative proceedings list.
Even a simple review of the hundreds of compiled administrative proceeding documents can illustrate patterns through their dates. The SEC’s
actions to create compensation funds clearly balance multiple goals: they are
enforcing the law and deterring wrongdoing in addition to compensating
victims. Those objectives would predict more actions in periods with more
identified wrongdoing, but there is no clear reason these goals would cause
intra-year seasonality across multiple years. If anything, victim compensation,
enforcement, and deterrence should lead administrative proceedings’ distribution within a year to resemble the ebbs and flows of general white-collar
proceedings and 100 in administrative proceedings.”). For the statutory basis for the SEC’s
authority to use these avenues, see 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2018).
258 Velikonja, supra note 214, at 334.
259 SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, supra note 12, at 17–18.
260 Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643–44 (2017).
261 Distributions in Commission Administrative Proceedings: Notices and Orders Pertaining to
Disgorgement and Fair Funds, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/fairfundlist.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2020). An earlier version of this website’s records formed the core of another
paper’s more comprehensive empirical analysis of SEC disbursements. Velikonja, supra
note 214, at 348.
262 SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, at 42 (2019) (promising implementation in fiscal year 2020). This “comprehensive” system will “improve both financial
and programmatic reporting of enforcement actions.” Caryn E. Kauffman, Message from the
Chief Financial Officer, in SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2019, supra at 46. As
of the start of fiscal year 2021, the system is not yet operational and public. The fiscal year
2020 target date was already behind the original plan for a fiscal year 2019 implementation. SEC, AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 51 (2017).
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business (e.g., with lulls around the winter holiday season or the height of
summer when vacations and beaches beckon). Whereas the SEC may have
limited control over the timing of court proceedings that depend on judges’
schedules, the timing of administrative proceedings can offer a particularly
direct glimpse into the SEC’s objectives and strategy.
However, the SEC’s administrative proceedings do not match this prediction. The SEC follows the federal government’s fiscal year and publishes
its accomplishments in reports for years ending in September.263 Two of the
eye-catching numbers in each year’s Division of Enforcement annual report
are the total disgorgement and penalties ordered and the total amount
returned to investors.264 In administrative proceedings, the conclusion to
order disgorgement or penalties usually appears in records that include the
phrase “Making Finding” in the title, and records approving the repayment
of funds to specific harmed investors usually have titles with the phrases “Disbursement” or “Payment of Certain Funds.” If the Commission had not
found that a case’s defendant should disgorge funds, the case would not
appear on this website, so all of the conclusive findings should add to the
SEC’s number and value of its victories. Based on the one hundred distinct
“Making Finding” records and ninety-eight distinct repayment-related
records from fiscal years 2013–2020, Figures 2 and 3 suggest these orders
occur more frequently right before the annual reporting cutoff and less frequently right after it.265
263 See, e.g., Velikonja, supra note 214, at 357; supra notes 230–33 and accompanying
text.
264 For fiscal years 2015–2020, total disgorgements and penalties totaled $4,194 million,
$4,083 million, $3,789 million, $3,945 million, $4,349 million, and $4,680 million. For the
same period, total funds disbursed to harmed investors totaled $158 million, $140 million,
$1,073 million, $794 million, $1,197 million, and $602 million. SEC, DIV. OF ENF’T, supra
note 12, at 17–18.
265 On October 1, 2020, I saved PDF copies of the SEC’s online pages listing the
records for disgorgement and fair fund administrative proceedings. Distributions in Commission Administrative Proceedings, supra note 261; Archive of Terminated Fair Funds and Disgorgement Plans, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/litigation/fairfundlist-archive.htm (last visited
Oct. 2, 2020). I then copied the now-stable data from the PDF into a spreadsheet, where I
removed extraneous data like headers and consolidated information that had been broken
apart through my copying (e.g., long record titles). This created a population of 114 active
funds and 135 terminated funds. Some of these had multiple recorded findings, multiple
disbursement orders, or ultimately transferred their funds to the U.S. Treasury instead of
to victims (e.g., in cases with a hard-to-define set of harmed investors). Using spreadsheet
formulas, I flagged the records that used the term “Disbursement” or “Payment of Certain
Funds” since those documents marked fund outflows and excluded outflows to the U.S.
Treasury or administrative costs. I similarly flagged records that used the term “Making
Findings” to identify when SEC adjudications imposed disgorgements or penalties: record
titles’ syntax varied too much for a longer search phrase, and the term’s vagueness is not a
major issue since the SEC must have found a disgorgement or penalty appropriate for the
website to include the record. For each of the two document types, I eliminated instances
of multiple equivalent records occurring on the same day (e.g., findings for different parties in one proceeding). This left 233 records of findings and 256 disbursement records. I
then extracted the dates from each record and grouped the results. Almost all of the
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The figures show more than an end-of-fiscal-year uptick. There also
appears to have been a shift from the SEC during President Obama’s second
term to the SEC during President Trump’s tenure. Fiscal years 2013–2016
saw the SEC complete an elevated number of administrative findings but not
disbursement orders in Augusts and Septembers. Fiscal years 2017–2020 also
saw an August–September uptick in administrative findings, and they addirecords were from after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 that expanded how
the SEC could compensate investors. See supra note 255. Figures 2 and 3 build on the one
hundred findings and ninety-eight disbursements from fiscal years 2013–2020. In contrast
to an initial post-Sarbanes-Oxley period and the Great Recession, 2013–2020 saw annual
counts of both record types roughly stabilize. That time period has the added benefit of
being about half under the Obama Administration and about half under the Trump
Administration. The records with dates through fiscal year 2012 do not show the same
build-up through September that Figures 2 and 3 show, but an absence of earlier years’
reporting benchmarks and the clean-up of the financial crisis may have drowned out pressures related to annual reporting deadlines.
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tionally exhibit an upward trend in disbursement orders over the year. Using
each document type’s full 2013–2020 data once they are aggregated by quarter, a straightforward chi-squared test indicates both document types’ date
distributions are significantly different from a uniform distribution across the
year at a 90% confidence level.266
Although counts are low enough that data processing errors or outliers
could have a nontrivial effect, the charts and numbers indicate aseasonal
motivations like law enforcement or victim compensation do not fully
explain how the SEC handles these administrative proceedings. It is possible
the irregular pattern stems from something as simple as calendar-based staffing changes, such as junior attorneys ending fixed-duration tenures for the
Commission (which signed the catalogued records) or the Enforcement Division. That concern does not obviously apply to the SEC,267 but even if it did,
that would show agency actions fitting to priorities other than the public
interest and victims’ interests.
To the extent the seasonal pattern reflects agency-wide thinking, the pattern in administrative proceedings suggests that the SEC’s approach to court
proceedings for victims’ benefit may also face high internal bureaucratic
pressures. While the SEC is unusually active among federal agencies in its
pursuit of disgorgements, internal pressures that shape when and how the
SEC pursues disgorgements can influence how other agencies seek victim
compensation.
The administrative proceedings’ pattern aligns with the theoretical
observations of Lemos, Minzner, and others about potential issues with regulators’ motivations in suing for citizens’ benefit.268 Annual checkpoints
might encourage SEC adjudicators and litigators to drive proceedings forward rather than dawdle, but there is a risk that SEC officials’ deadlines cause
them to disburse funds sloppily or settle for disgorgements below what private litigators would seek. Additionally, the shift in the administrative pro266 Some months like May had low counts of records in the 2013–2020 data, which
could undermine a chi-squared test’s ability to reach valid results across twelve monthly
data bins. Summing data across quarters (October–December, January–March,
April–June, and July–September) eliminated that issue. This summation found there were
twenty-one administrative findings in Q1 of fiscal years 2013–2020, twenty-three in Q2,
seventeen in Q3, and thirty-nine in Q4. This produced a chi-squared value of 11.20, which
is above the 6.25 critical value for a chi-squared distribution with three degrees of freedom
(because there are four quarters) at a 90% confidence level. The summation also found
there were seventeen disbursement orders in Q1 of fiscal years 2013–2020, twenty-one in
Q2, twenty-six in Q3, and thirty-four in Q4. This produced a chi-squared value of 6.57.
267 The SEC website’s page for Entry Level Attorneys is solely about the Chair’s Attorney Honors Program, which is a two-year development program that rotates through
offices and divisions. Chair’s Attorney Honors Program, SEC (June 26, 2020), https://
www.sec.gov/ohr/chairs-attorney-honors-program. For that to affect a once-a-year uptick
like Figures 2 and 3 show, these junior staffers would have to either have only two rotations
in their two-year program or the junior attorneys are far more productive in one period of
the year.
268 See supra notes 228–40 and accompanying text.
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ceeding date distribution from the Obama years to the Trump years raises
the possibility that changes in agency strategy or personnel can have a material impact on how the SEC approaches victim compensation.269 Such
changes in approaches do not necessarily prioritize assistance to these cases’
victims. They could emphasize the SEC’s other stated goal of enforcement,
but they could also reflect organizational changes or changes in officials’
style and competence. Such changes could be good. As times change and
new leaders enter office, an evolution in agency actions could showcase
accumulating expertise or reallocate resources to match what voters selected
at the ballot box. Even so, to the extent that the SEC extracts and distributes
funds for victims’ benefit in lieu of private lawsuits, there is a risk of inconsistent justice when a staffing change in Washington can substantially affect a
private party’s redress from a private wrongdoer. This analysis of SEC
records does not indicate anything shocking: deadlines encourage agency
officials to meet them, and agency actions may change when victims’ interests
in those actions do not. That being said, this is an intuitive complement to
other authors’ concern about an agency’s objectives as that agency actively
participates in victim compensation.
III. A POTENTIAL STARTING POINT

FOR

FEDERAL PARENS PATRIAE

Based on the cases described in this Note’s previous parts, a federal
judge in a civil case follows a thought process roughly summarized in Figure
4 when deciding if the court has jurisdiction to hear claims for the plaintiff’s
desired remedy. This assumes that other matters like personal jurisdiction
and venue have been satisfied and this is not an unusual type of case that is
outside this Note’s scope (e.g., qui tam actions).

269 Another explanation is that the 2017 Kokesh ruling caused the SEC to reassess how it
approached disgorgements. However, that would readily explain a shift in what cases the
SEC pursued, the amounts it pursued in those cases, and how it planned to use disgorged
funds. It is less clear how the ruling would affect the SEC’s calendar.
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FEDERAL CIVIL SUITS

Is the plaintiff in this federal civil suit a
private victim(s) or the federal/state
government?
Victim(s)
Check if the plaintiff has standing
like usual. Additional procedure
for class actions.
Yes
Statute created a federal interest.
Standing is probably not a problem.
State
Check for quasi-sovereign interest
to see if state has parens patriae
standing (Section I.A, Alfred L.
Snapp & Son).

Government
Does federal law clearly authorize
this plaintiff to bring this suit?
No
State or federal plaintiff?

Federal
Check the court’s equitable power
to grant the sought remedy and if
any statute limits that power
(Section I.B, Liu, AMG Capital
Management).

If the plaintiff is a victim, a group of victims, or an entire class of victims,
the judge must assess if this is the right plaintiff to bring this claim and seek
this remedy. If the plaintiff is a state that lacks explicit federal authorization
to bring this suit, the judge must assess if the state has a quasi-sovereign interest and is thereby the right plaintiff to bring this claim and seek this remedy
for its citizens. If the plaintiff is a federal agency that lacks explicit statutory
authorization, Liu suggests the judge does not assess whether the agency is
the right plaintiff to bring this claim for its citizens.
Following Liu, the judge should instead become self-reflective and consider the extent of the court’s equitable power. Under Porter and Mitchell,
this power is extensive and especially broad when the plaintiff acts in the
public interest. If AMG Capital Management rules against the FTC by adopting the Third Circuit’s AbbVie reasoning or some compromise between circuit opinions instead of following Judge O’Scannlain’s or the Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning, precedent supports the government having particular
authority to identify the public interest. If so, the court’s equitable powers to
grant remedies to a federal agency are not subject to some or all of the limitations suggested by Meghrig, Sandoval, or other cases with private plaintiffs
from the last few decades. The judge would also have to check that statutes
do not limit the court’s equitable powers, which under the likely AMG Capital
Management decision would mean seeing if statutes specifically allow certain
equitable remedies and implicitly bar others. If the statute is silent on gov-
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ernment equitable remedies or authorizes a vague, open-ended list of equitable remedies, the court’s equitable powers are at the agency’s disposal for
victims’ benefit.
Although these concerns with private, state, and federal plaintiffs all
revolve around the federal court’s jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s case, the
concerns for the first two rely on the plaintiff to build up its argument for
standing and why it should be allowed into court. Federal agencies seeking
equitable relief file their claims with the privilege of the broadest extent of
courts’ equitable power, and the court must decide from complaints and
answers if Congress prevented it from exercising that equitable power as the
plaintiff wants. Whether the agency plans to give awarded funds to the Treasury or to victims influences that decision under Kokesh and Liu, but the
details of victim disbursements and the agency’s likelihood of representing
all victims fully and faithfully have no clear bearing on the court’s decision
because they do not affect the court’s equitable powers. As a federal agency
pursues a variety of objectives, including some that may seem arbitrary or
selfish, agencies’ path to the full extent of courts’ permitted equitable powers
risks shortchanging victims.
The linkage between what courts can grant and what agencies can pursue also raises at least three potential separation of powers issues. First,
courts reading Congress’s silence or vagueness as allowing them to exercise a
broad range of equitable remedies may permit agencies to have abilities Congress had not intended. Second, agencies may pull courts to the edges of
their authority to adjudicate actual cases and controversies. Agencies’ claims
may fall within permitted equitable remedies without the cases clearly demonstrating the concrete adverseness other types of plaintiffs must prove. This
is particularly concerning when agency lawsuits lack class action suits’ standardized reviews and agencies can be less transparent than other plaintiffs’
suits. Third, another possible problem is courts’ ability as a co-equal branch
of government to check the executive branch’s agencies. If courts ever
expand their equitable powers’ scope (e.g., because of a reassessment of history, ambitious judges, or novel circumstances), courts’ current approach
would cause the executive’s power to grow in tandem as the executive can
seek more remedies subject to statutory constraints. Across these separation
of powers frictions, courts’ approach to agency lawsuits quietly amplifies
executive power through the federal courts.
Recognition of a new federal parens patriae doctrine would decouple
agencies’ authority from courts’ equitable powers with the introduction of a
standing threshold that agencies must cross. Courts can do this by copying
much of the existing minority view of the parens patriae doctrine discussed
in subsection I.A.1 and applying it exclusively to the federal government. As
represented in the Massachusetts v. EPA dissent, this minority view sees the
parens patriae doctrine less as a channel into court and more as an added
hurdle the government must overcome by showing that citizens have standing and the plaintiff has a quasi-sovereign interest that is distinct from vic-
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tims’ interests.270 As cases like Alfred L. Snapp & Son showed, courts can be
generous to government plaintiffs when identifying quasi-sovereign interests,271 so adding a federal parens patriae review to agency suits would not
choke off agencies’ access to judicial equitable remedies. Explicit discussion
of quasi-sovereign interests like enforcement would necessitate examination
of agencies’ objectives and interests in a case. This could allow courts to turn
away agency cases when they would lack adequate adverseness or when they
would fail to remedy victims’ injuries.272 Court scrutiny of agency cases can
also allow courts to apply at least some of class action litigation’s existing
checks to federal agency claims, thereby improving the fairness and transparency of agency cases that proceed. Some of these checks may be inappropriate for a federal agency due to the agency’s discretion in its resource
allocation and the government’s special role in identifying the public interest. Still, a federal parens patriae doctrine would start the conversation of
identifying what specific checks are appropriate.
A federal parens patriae doctrine would be consistent with existing legal
conclusions. Since the majority view of the parens patriae doctrine’s origin
and application does not include the federal government, a distinct federal
parens patriae doctrine would not affect the existing state-oriented doctrine.
It would also probably not require any substantial changes to Liu and AMG
Capital Management. Because parens patriae standing is a prudential doctrine, statutes can change where courts can and cannot recognize it.273 Satisfying federal parens patriae standing should include having an appropriate
judicial remedy, and parens patriae cannot override Congress, so Congress’s
statutory limitations on remedies under Liu and AMG Capital Management
would be unaffected by a federal parens patriae standing doctrine. AMG
Capital Management might differentiate government and private plaintiffs
explicitly in its argument, implicitly in how it applies cases like Meghrig, or in
its silence on logic like Porter’s or American Stores’s. In that event, the development of a new standing check specific to the federal government carries that
differentiation forward. If AMG Capital Management blurs the public-private
distinction like Credit Bureau Center did, then federal parens patriae remains
worthwhile as it could align Figure 4’s terminal nodes: federal plaintiffs
would face a standing gauntlet like other types of plaintiffs instead of accessing whatever courts can provide. Federal parens patriae should therefore
slip into current legal frameworks with relative ease.
270 See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text; Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
538–40 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
271 See supra notes 29–38 and accompanying text.
272 Kokesh and Liu considered whether restitution benefitted victims and did not consider how effectively that restitution redressed the injury. It is therefore possible for an
agency seeking a Liu-compliant equitable disgorgement to estimate a wrongdoer’s net
profits inaccurately or below what a reasonable group of victims would estimate. Standing’s check for whether a sought remedy would redress the alleged injury would provide
courts with a firmer way to monitor for this sort of underestimation.
273 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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In doing so, this doctrine can replace the current silence in agency procedures and the potential separation of powers issues. Whereas agencies’
equitable remedies are grounded in equitable powers that are not affected by
agency procedures, federal parens patriae standing would depend on how
the agency intends to pursue a case and handle awarded funds since these
can show if the sought remedy would address victims’ injuries. Courts’
checks on agency processes under a federal parens patriae doctrine would
then improve how often agency cases assist victims appropriately. In the separation of powers realm, a standing circuit breaker between what agencies
can seek and what courts can provide would allow courts to identify situations
when Congress did not limit the courts but intended to constrain agencies, in
which case the agency cannot have standing for unattainable remedies. Federal parens patriae standing would also help courts stay squarely within actual
cases and controversies by barring cases without sufficient adverseness.
Finally, the doctrine could allow courts’ equitable powers to grow or evolve
without executive power moving in lockstep because some of those changes
would not affect what agencies could seek in court within federal parens
patriae’s requirements.
CONCLUSION
This Note has tried to bring together three distinct threads of scholarship and precedents to understand how federal agencies sue in federal court
on behalf of wrongdoing’s victims. The first was the parens patriae doctrine,
which remains hazy and debated but does not generally facilitate federal
agency lawsuits. The second concerned the ongoing debate over the equitable remedies federal agencies can receive. When statutes do not explicitly
authorize a right of action and remedy for an agency, cases since the 1940s
have empowered federal agencies to seek whatever equitable remedies courts
can provide. Kokesh and Liu showed that these remedies follow historical
practice subject to the limits that statutes impose. The Supreme Court’s
upcoming AMG Capital Management decision will address whether a statute
that lists specific equitable remedies also permits other equitable remedies.
In light of Liu, the opinions on this subject from the Ninth, Seventh, and
Third Circuits offer compelling reasons for the Supreme Court to find that
Congress limited agencies to the listed equitable remedies. Under the less
disruptive approaches the Court could take to reach this outcome, doctrine
under Porter and subsequent cases would remain largely unchanged subject
to moderately elevated recognition of statutes’ limitations. The implications
of a more disruptive approach are harder to predict but could restrict Porter’s
significance and place Meghrig-like limits on agencies’ implied remedies.
This Note’s third thread was the group of issues in how agencies litigate
for victims. Agency processes can harm victims’ access to courts, skew lawsuits away from victim restitution, and face minimal procedural checks.
While some of these problems had little more than one-off examples as proof
or have been studied mostly outside the context of agency lawsuits, the dates
of SEC administrative proceedings are consistent with previous authors’ con-
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cern that agencies may act in self-serving ways that do not further restitution
or enforcement.
Based on these three fields, courts should consider introducing a new
federal parens patriae doctrine that would apply specifically to lawsuits by the
federal government. Such a doctrine can build on existing parens patriae
analysis that readily recognizes quasi-sovereign interests while forcing agencies through a meaningful standing check before they can access the judicial
equitable powers permitted under Liu and AMG Capital Management. Recent
cases’ focus on courts’ equitable powers contrasts with how individual plaintiffs, class action plaintiffs, and state plaintiffs access courts. A federal parens
patriae doctrine would therefore fix federal plaintiffs’ place in the constellation of possible plaintiffs and potentially improve the remedies victims
receive through agency action. A natural next step in developing the framework of a federal parens patriae doctrine is to examine how courts scrutinize
class action litigation to see which of those tests courts should apply to federal agencies. The nuances of what an agency can do is also likely to shift
after the Supreme Court publishes its AMG Capital Management opinion, so
the proposed federal parens patriae model should shift accordingly. Even
with these sizable open ends, federal parens patriae offers a new yardstick for
measuring how agencies work for victims and how courts can improve agency
litigation’s results.
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